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Security Council

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Tuesday, 16 June 2015, 4 p.m.
New York

President:	Mr. Ibrahim	(Malaysia)
Members:	Angola	Mr. Lucas
	Chad	Mr. Mangaral
	Chile	Mr. Barros Melet
	China	Mr. Wang Min
	France	Mr. Bertoux
	Jordan	Mr. Hmoud
	Lithuania	Ms. Murmokaitė
	New Zealand	Mr. Van Bohemen
	Nigeria	Mr. Adamu
	Russian Federation	Mr. Safronkov
	Spain	Mr. Oyarzun Marchesi
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Mr. Rycroft
	United States of America	Ms. Sison
	Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	Mr. Ramírez Carreño

Agenda

Briefings by Chairs of subsidiary bodies of the Security Council

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The meeting was called to order at 4.30 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Briefings by Chairs of subsidiary bodies of the Security Council

The President: The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda.

At the outset, Ambassador Román Oyarzun Marchesi will make a joint statement on behalf of the Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011), concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities; the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001), concerning counter-terrorism; and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). Following that joint statement, the Council will hear briefings by the Chairs of those three Committees.

I now give the floor to Ambassador Oyarzun Marchesi.

Mr. Oyarzun Marchesi (Spain) (*spoke in Spanish*): On behalf of the Chairs of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011), concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities; the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001), concerning counter-terrorism; and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), concerning the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, I have the honour to inform the Security Council of the continued cooperation among those three committees and their respective Groups of Experts, in accordance with the Council's request under its resolutions 2083 (2012), 1963 (2010), 1977 (2011) and prior resolutions.

Terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and the risk of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction on the part of non-State actors continue to pose a grave threat to international peace and security. In order to address that grave threat, the Security Council has stressed the importance of close and effective coordination among the Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, the Anti-Terrorism Committee and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). Since the last time the Council received updated information, the three Committees have continued to cooperate on dissemination carried out within the frameworks of their respective mandates; have strengthened their cooperation with international, regional and subregional organizations; and have conducted joint visits, increased their exchange of information, coordinated their activities with respect to travel and planning, and established a common focal point. I would like to provide more detailed information on the areas of increased cooperation.

Dissemination activities and country visits are important tools that enable the three Committees to fulfil their respective mandates. Since November 2014, the three Groups of Experts have been represented in more than a dozen workshops and other activities of dissemination; at least two of those Groups participated in additional meetings. Since the previous briefing (see S/PV.7331), the three Groups of Experts have continued to cooperate within the context of official visits to Member States. For example, in April, the Monitoring Team and the Group of Experts of the 1540 Committee joined the follow-up visit to Uzbekistan by the Executive Directorate of the Anti-Terrorism Committee on behalf of that Committee. In May, the Group of Experts of the 1540 Committee accompanied the Executive Directorate of the Anti-Terrorism Committee on a specific visit to Italy that took place on behalf of the Anti-Terrorism Committee. Joint participation in country visits continues to contribute to improving cooperation and exchange of information among the three Expert Groups and ensures that the Groups transmit a single message and present a unified position to Member States. As a means for strengthening cooperation, the Groups of Experts continued to coordinate their country visits and dissemination activities.

The Executive Directorate of the Anti-Terrorism Committee and the Expert Group of the 1540 Committee share a focal point in the Caribbean that works with Member States in the region to strengthen dialogue with both Committees and to increase awareness and understanding of the provisions of resolutions 1373 (2001), 1540 (2004), 1624 (2005) and 2178 (2014). At the institutional level, that also encourages inter-agency support for national implementation initiatives, coordinates the delivery of technical assistance based on States' specific needs and acts as an early-warning mechanism. The focal point submitted a progress report to the Counter-Terrorism Committee on 18 December 2014.

In February 2015, the Security Council adopted resolution 2199 (2015) to stem the financing of terrorists through the illicit oil trade. The resolution has made a major contribution to consolidating international efforts to counter the threat posed by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Sham (ISIS) and Al-Nusra Front. However, the level of reporting has thus far been insufficient. Therefore, the 1267 Committee urges Member States to submit, as soon as possible, reports in conformity with paragraph 29 of the resolution and to continue to report in conformity with paragraph 2.

With regard to cooperation with international, regional and subregional organizations, the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate and the 1267 Committee Monitoring Team continued their close cooperation in countering money laundering and the of financing of terrorism, in particular by freezing terrorist assets. It should be highlighted that the Monitoring Team represented the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate at the twenty-first plenary meeting of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Task Force held in Oman in April. As a recurring practice, the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate and the Monitoring Team provide joint comments on draft legislation relating to the finance-related provisions of resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1373 (2001), upon requests by Member States. In that context, the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate and the Monitoring Team provided joint comments to Tanzania and Uganda concerning their respective draft laws on the implementation of the two resolutions' asset freezing requirements and the implementation of financial measures.

The three Expert Groups are all counter-terrorism implementation task force entities. In that regard, the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force continues to provide a platform for enhanced cooperation by the three Expert Groups, not only among themselves but also among over 30 United Nations organizations, agencies and programmes concerned with various aspects of counter-terrorism. The Monitoring Team and the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate have also continued their leading roles in their respective Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force working groups. The 1540 Committee Group of Experts participated in the Working Group on Border Management Relating to Counter-Terrorism and the Working Group on Preventing and Responding to Weapons of Mass Destruction Attacks. The three Committees have close cooperation on issues related to border management. As Chair of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force Working Group on Border Management Relating to Counter-Terrorism, the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate presided over the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force Experts Meeting on Coordinated Border Management held in Lyon in May 2015. The experts from the Monitoring Team and 1540 Committee Group of Experts attended the meeting and contributed to the discussion of the templates developed by the Team in cooperation with the Stimson Center on coordination of border management. Discussions among the three Expert Groups included future participation and cooperation of the Working Groups on border management in order to better coordinate a comprehensive manner to help national border management agencies carry out their duties more effectively.

The Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate also worked closely with the Monitoring Team in providing comments and suggestions to the Working Group on tackling the financing of terrorism, regarding its capacity-building initiative on asset freezing, pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1373 (2001). This month, the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate and the Monitoring Team will deliver a joint presentation on the financing of foreign terrorist fighters to the Financial Action Task Force plenary meeting.

Exchange of information among the Expert Groups continues to be carried out on a regular basis. The Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate regularly shares with the other two groups the monthly reports submitted by its Executive Director to the Counter-Terrorism Committee, including information on its recent missions, country visits and technical assistance activities. As a new initiative, the three Expert Groups have shared their respective working calendars of events and discussed ways of improving the effectiveness and efficiency of country visits and capacity-building potential, with a view to improving cost efficiency. The experts of the 1540 Committee prepare informative notes on the Committee's outreach events and post them on its website for the sake of transparency and sharing of information.

The Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate and the Monitoring Team routinely rely on and reference each others' reports and analyses. For example, on 18 February 2015, the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate's report

on the prosecutorial challenges associated with bringing terrorists to justice, adopted by the Security Council, was quoted in the Monitoring Team's report on foreign terrorist fighters, while the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate referenced the Monitoring Team's work in its report on foreign terrorist fighters.

The Security Council's presidential statement of 19 November 2014 (S/PRST/2014/23) requested that the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate prepare within 180 days an analysis of the gaps in Member States' use of advance passenger information and make recommendations to expand its use. The Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate closely consulted with the Monitoring Team in preparing that report.

In April 2015, the Monitoring Team attended an expert briefing organized by the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate on the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. The three Expert Groups continue to hold joint meetings when appropriate — whether involving the heads of each team or the Expert Teams — in order to prepare for relevant outreach activities and exchange information on themes specific to countries or regions.

The work of the three Committees, when taken as a whole, presents opportunities for additional synergies, which, once fully realized, would have a multiplier effect on achieving outcomes. It should be possible to achieve such improved results while also respecting the independence of the respective Expert Groups and their mandates. On the basis of current coordination and joint cooperation, each of the three Committee's staff and Expert Groups are committed to advancing cooperation in a number of areas. As previously mentioned, those include but are not limited to the holding of meetings among the three Committees at the committee level and/or among chairing countries; increasing engagement in on-site visits to States, at their request, in order to facilitate the implementation of each of the resolutions; coordinating a common regional approach to engage with Member States with geographical and political similarities; and coordinating on key thematic areas of interest to all Committees in order to benefit from sharing of information, experience and effective practices. They also include improving coordination in implementing projects within the framework of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, particularly through the various thematic working groups; coordinating approaches to donor States and assistance providers, and the joint evaluation of outcomes; considering the possibility of developing joint assistance packages for States at their request and where necessary; enhancing joint interaction, particularly with non-reporting States, in their fulfilment of their reporting obligations under the relevant resolutions; cooperating on input into the 1540 Committee's 2016 comprehensive implementation review, as required under resolution 1977 (2011); and, in cooperation with other United Nations counter-terrorism entities, enhancing the work between the Al-Qaida Monitoring Team and Executive Directorate on measures that can improve the implementation of resolution 2199 (2015).

I would like to thank you, Mr. President, and the members of the Council, for the opportunity to make this joint statement on behalf of the three Committees.

The President: I thank Ambassador Oyarzun Marchesi for his briefing.

I now give the floor to Ambassador Van Bohemen.

Mr. Van Bohemen (New Zealand): At our joint Council briefing in May 2014 (see S/PV.7184), Ambassador Gary Quinlan — the then Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011), concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities — raised the issue of the evolving nature of the threat posed by Al-Qaida and its affiliates, including the group's localization and globalization and its new generation of leadership. Since then we have seen that threat develop dramatically through the rapid territorial gains and brutal tactics of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), also known as Daesh, as well as, to a lesser extent, of the Al-Nusra Front. That has been further intensified by the presence of foreign terrorist fighters and the growing influence of Al-Qaida associates in Libya. In today's briefing I will outline how the threat from Al-Qaida and its affiliates has evolved over the past year, as well as describing the Committee's response, the ways in which Member States can engage with it, and its upcoming work.

Over the past year we have witnessed a marked increase in ISIL's use of digital media to promote its messages, in order both to shock and intimidate and to recruit others to its cause. Despite the role that digital media has played, direct social contact has also remained a key factor in recruitment. The human cost

of Al-Qaida and ISIL-related attacks is immense and tragic, not only in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic but also in parts of Nigeria, Libya, Yemen, Afghanistan, Somalia and further afield. Many attacks are on innocent civilians and even on places of religious worship, such as those that resulted recently in the deaths of 25 people at Friday prayers in a mosque in Saudi Arabia. While the peoples of Syria and Iraq are most at risk, no State is immune to the threat of terrorism.

In response to the evolving threat from Al-Qaida and its affiliates, the Council has adopted various resolutions expanding the work of the Committee and its Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, for example, in relation to oil and financing. In addition to its regular reporting, the Monitoring Team has submitted reports to the Committee on ISIL and the Al-Nusra Front (S/2014/815) and on foreign terrorist fighters (S/2015/358). It is also due to submit a report to the Committee by 12 July on the implementation of resolution 2199 (2015), regarding ISIL and oil interdictions, and to report on the threat in Libya by 27 September. The Monitoring Team's workload continues to increase, presenting challenges for its resources, and we want to commend it for its dedication and the quality of its work.

The growing terror threat has led to an increase in designations of individuals and entities associated with Al-Qaida. Between June 2013 and May 2014, six individuals and entities were designated, while between June 2014 and May 2015, that number rose to 41. More than half of the listings were related to the issue of foreign terrorist fighters. There has also been an increase in Member States' use of the assets-freeze exemptions, with five granted between June 2014 and May 2015, as opposed to one in the previous period. We welcome further designations by Member States. I would like to emphasize that listings should be strategic, targeted and implementable. We want the sanctions to have a practical effect, and to focus on targeting individuals and entities that can be disrupted. The Monitoring Team can assist Member States in preparing listing and exemption requests.

The sanctions list is a living document that must be kept up-to-date, relevant, fair and transparent. There are three ways the Committee does that. The first is through its triennial review, which considers whether listings, especially those that have not been reviewed for three years, are still relevant and implementable. The Committee is in the process of finalizing the 2014 triennial review, and I would like to thank the Member States that have provided information for the review, since obtaining responses from all the Member States that have designated individuals and entities has been a challenge. We urge all Member States to engage with the Committee on the 2015 triennial review, which we will be undertaking shortly.

The second way is through the delisting requests submitted to the independent Office of the Ombudsperson by designated individuals and entities. The Ombudsperson plays an integral role in ensuring that the Committee's procedures are fair and transparent and that the list dynamically reflects the threat posed by Al-Qaida and its affiliates. The Ombudsperson continues to have a significant caseload and role. Since the Committee's last briefing to the Council, six individuals and entities have been delisted and three retained, following the Committee's consideration of reports submitted by the Ombudsperson. There are currently 10 petitions received through the Ombudsperson that are under various stages of consideration. Thirdly, the Monitoring Team regularly updates the list based on information provided by Member States, and we encourage them to keep the Monitoring Team informed.

For sanctions to be effective they must be clear, targeted and implementable. Several initiatives have been taken in that regard. Earlier this year, the Chair produced a procedural note clarifying the reporting requirements of resolution 2199 (2015), adopted in February with the aim of stemming the financing of terrorists through the illicit oil trade. While the resolution has made a major contribution to consolidating international efforts to counter the threat posed by ISIL and the Al-Nusra Front, the level of reporting has so far been insufficient. The Committee therefore urges Member States to submit their reports required under paragraph 29 of the resolution as soon as possible, and to continuously submit those reports required under paragraph 12. We also look forward to the Monitoring Team's assessment, in cooperation with other United Nations counter-terrorism bodies, of the impact of the measures, and to proposals for improving their implementation. In February, the Monitoring Team also produced three explanation-of-terms papers on the sanctions measures, which are available on the Committee's website.

Work is also being done to standardize the format of all United Nations sanctions lists and to update the

Committee's website to make it more user-friendly. The Committee is mandated, with the Monitoring Team's assistance, to consider issues of possible non-compliance with sanctions measures, and has received complaints from Member States. On 24 April the Chair held an open briefing for interested Member States that included discussion of the implementation issues. I encourage Member States to share any queries and concerns with the Committee and the Monitoring Team. We stand ready to assist.

As for the Committee's future activities, the Monitoring Team will be presenting reports on Libya and the impact of resolution 2199 (2015). The Committee is currently discussing the recommendations of the Monitoring Team's seventeenth report, and we hope to have those agreed on shortly. I also plan to continue to hold regular open briefings on the work of the Committee for all interested Member States.

I would like to take this opportunity today to note there will be a changing of the guard in the roles of the Ombudsperson and Monitoring Team, and especially the Coordinator. Both are crucial to the Committee's work and the ability of the regime to respond effectively, fairly and transparently to the evolving threat posed by Al-Qaida and its affiliates. I would like to thank the Ombudsperson, Kimberly Prost, and the Monitoring Team, including its Coordinator, Alexander Evans, for their tireless efforts, and to wish them the very best in their future endeavours.

To conclude, I want to re-emphasize that the 1267 Sanctions Committee relies on cooperation from Member States so that Al-Qaida and its affiliates are designated, sanctions are implemented and the tragic toll of terrorism is prevented.

The President: I thank Ambassador Van Bohemen for his briefing.

I now give the floor to Ambassador Murmokaitė.

Ms. Murmokaitė (Lithuania): Allow me to make a brief statement on behalf of the Counter-Terrorism Committee to provide an overview of the developments in the work of the Committee and the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED).

As I reported on 29 May (see S/PV.7453), the Committee, with the support of CTED ande as mandated by paragraph 24 of resolution 2178 (2014), has undertaken a wide range of actions to address the threat of foreign terrorist fighters and is in the process of producing a series of new tools designed to facilitate its dialogue with Member States on the implementation of resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005), as well as aimed at analysing measures specific to resolution 2178 (2014). The Committee has dedicated much of its efforts in 2015 to identifying principal gaps and good practices that stem the flow of foreign terrorist fighters. It submitted to the Council three relevant reports: on challenges in prosecutions related to foreign terrorist fighters (S/2015/123), on the implementation of resolution 2178 (2014) by some Member States affected by foreign terrorist fighters (5/2015/338) and on the use of advance passenger information (S/2015/377). I would like to inform the Council today on the ways in which in recent months the Committee has more broadly revitalized the way it works in order to maximize the speed and effectiveness of its responses to new and urgent challenges.

In the 13 years of its existence, the Committee and CTED have accumulated a vast database of information and analysis about the implementation of counter-terrorism measures in all Member States. Since 2005, the Committee has visited more than half the membership, and many Member States more than once. That has enabled the Committee to track the progress of implementation over time. In its recent visits, particularly since September 2014, the Committee was able to address measures related to the implementation of resolution 2178 (2014) in order to gain a better understanding of the practical measures undertaken by Member States to stem the flow of foreign terrorist fighters. Those on-site assessments, especially in the most affected regions, have proved to be of great value to the Committee in carrying out its mandate.

The Committee's goal this year has been to adopt measures by which this unique store of evidence can be swiftly and responsively leveraged and utilized to facilitate useful and sustainable technical assistance where and when it is needed. It aims to produce not an assessment or critique of the shortfalls of Member States, but rather a detailed road map of concrete measures to be taken by Member States and close partners to help them build their capacities to resist the threat of terrorism. The Committee needs to take such measures not in the least because of the tasks that the Council has assigned to it in its presidential statement of 29 May (S/PRST/2015/11).

To that end, the Committee has for the first time adopted a risk-based approach, where appropriate,

aimed at facilitating capacity-building tailored to each Member State's needs. The huge diversity of Member States, in terms of their size and population, the nature of the various threats posed by terrorists to particular Member States, as well as the Member States' relative capacities and vulnerabilities to address those threats, makes a one-size-fits-all approach impractical. Member States should develop a response to the threat of terrorism based on their own particular national security concerns, rather than on a fixed template that might have little relevance to their situation.

In the same context, the Committee has been reinforcing its direct outreach to Member States. For instance, on 4 June, as Chair of the Committee, together with the Vice-Chairs and CTED, I held a meeting here in New York with the representatives of five Central Asian countries, which was also attended by the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force and the Department of Political Affairs. Earlier this year, from 2 to 6 February, I conducted a high-level political mission to Mali and the Niger, together with CTED and the participation of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sahel and the Special Representative of the Chair of the African Union for Counter-Terrorism Cooperation.

Throughout its engagement, the Committee has consistently recalled the position of the Council that all measures taken by Member States to combat terrorism must comply with all their obligations under international law and that Member States should adopt such measures in accordance with international law, in particular international human rights, refugee and humanitarian law. The Committee is also taking steps to communicate more effectively to the wider membership the outcomes of its dialogue with Member States, international and regional organizations and various other stakeholders. It has therefore increased the number of open briefings, with three scheduled in this month alone — on Thursday, 18 June, on the use of advance passenger information, in collaboration with the International Civil Aviation Organization and the International Air Transport Association; this morning, on crisis management in the aftermath of a terrorist attack, with speakers from NATO, INTERPOL and the World Health Organization; and on Friday, 19 June, on the adoption of the new Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism.

The Committee's close relationships with various stakeholders have always been one of its great strengths. Aiming to convene with them to lead the formulation of integrated and coordinated responses on important issues, this year, the Committee is working on preparations for two special meetings — one on stemming the flow of foreign terrorist fighters, to be held in Madrid next month, the first meeting outside New York since 2011, and a second on preventing terrorists from exploiting the Internet and social media to recruit terrorists and incite terrorist acts, to be held in November. Earlier this year, on 19 February, the Committee launched a global research network developed by CTED with a view to enhancing its analytical capacity and engagement with leading think tanks and research institutions.

The Committee recognizes that its effectiveness rests not just on what is done but when it is done. To that end, it has been implementing measures to act more rapidly in its dialogue with Member States, and thus improve its responsiveness to their needs without sacrificing the quality of that dialogue or the opportunity for the States to consider carefully their responses to the Committee's outreach. One example is the Committee's request that CTED present an overview immediately on return from its follow-up visits. In the course of 2015, CTED has reported pro tempore to the Committee on visits to Oman, Tunisia, Turkey and Uzbekistan, while the Committee looks forward to the productive dialogue it continues to have with each of those Member States. The Committee will continue to take the necessary measures to ensure a practical, responsive and dynamic approach to its dialogue with all Member States, with a view to ensuring the effective implementation of resolutions 1373 (2001), 1624 (2005) and 2178 (2014).

The President: I thank Ambassador Murmokaitė for her briefing.

I shall now give the floor to the members of the Security Council.

Mr. Ramírez Carreño (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) (*spoke in Spanish*): Allow me to thank you, Mr. President, for convening this briefing on the work of the Committees established uprsuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1373 (2001) and 1540 (2004). We welcome the briefings of Ambassador Gerard Van Bohemen, Raimonda Murmokaitė and Mr. Román Oyarzun Marchesi as the respective Chairs of those subsidiary

bodies. We wish to thank them for their work and leadership. We are also grateful to Ambassador Román Oyarzun Marchesi for the joint briefing. We also welcome the coordination of effort among the three various teams.

The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is convinced that the fight against terrorism must be conducted within the framework of international cooperation and in accordance with existing international and regional instruments and the norms of international law, with full respect for the sovereignty of States, human rights and fundamental freedoms. Acts of extreme violence perpetrated by terrorist groups in the countries of Africa and the Middle East have intensified. Terrorism continues to be a serious threat to international peace and security. It is therefore necessary to implement measures prohibiting the funding, transfer of weapons and training of terrorist groups and non-State actors, pursuant to the relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions.

Venezuela reiterates its emphatic rejection of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, which constitute a flagrant violation of international law, including international humanitarian law and human rights. My country wishes to reiterate its concern about the nature and actions of non-State actors. They are a constant threat and source of violence, and in most cases they become terrorist groups. The Security Council must take strong measures to prevent the training, financing and supplying of weapons to non-State actors. Also, we regret that resolution 2220 (2015) does not include an explicit prohibition of the transfer of weapons to non-State actors. We urge the Council to rectify that matter.

In the fight against terrorism, we must act with a deep political sense. Beyond the combat operations against these elements, the international community must overcome the root causes of the crisis we are experiencing today. The humanitarian tragedy in Syria, Yemen and Libya, among other places, and the actions of Boko Haram, Al-Qaida and the Al-Nusra Front, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria and its associated groups call for the international community to provide preventive, systematic and strong responses to counteract the phenomenon.

We believe that the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011), concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, is an important tool in the fight against terrorism. We wish to reiterate the concern expressed by the Committee with regard to the military power and capacity of armed groups in their advance in Syria, Libya, Iraq and Yemen. We also express our concern about the unilateral action taken by some countries, which, on the grounds of combating terrorism, conduct illegal actions of targeted killings, arbitrary arrests, torture and bombings, which often lead to civilian casualties and are outside of international law. Terrorism should be fought from the perspective of multilateralism and in cooperation with the States concerned.

We also believe that it is particularly important to strengthen the role of the Ombudsperson in facilitating due process. We believe that this mechanism should be strengthened so as to have greater transparency. We thank Ms. Kimberley Prost for the independence and professionalism with which she has carried out her work throughout her mandate. We hope that her successor will soon be appointed.

In recent months, the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001), concerning counter-terrorism, has focused, with the assistance of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), on ensuring the implementation of the provisions set out in resolution 2178 (2014), concerning foreign terrorist fighters, and on identifying best practices and the gaps that Member States face in combating this problem. Foreign terrorist fighters now number 25,000 individuals, including women and young people, and come from at least 100 countries. A demonstration of this is the important reports issued by the Committee on the challenges of prosecuting foreign terrorist fighters and on ensuring effective border control in countries in conflict areas. The special meeting that the Committee will hold in Madrid on 27 and 28 July, on how to stop the flow of foreign terrorist fighters, is a positive initiative that contributes to a comprehensive approach to this global problem, and we fully support it.

Resolution 2178 (2014) marks a milestone in addressing the phenomenon of terrorism, and we call for its effective implementation. It encourages Member States to adopt a series of legal and political actions, in strict compliance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, to stop the flow of foreign terrorist fighters. We also deem it necessary to fully implement other relevant resolutions on the subject, such as resolution 1373 (2001), prohibiting the

financing of terrorism, and 1624 (2005), prohibiting incitement to join terrorist groups. There should be an assessment of the progress achieved this year, which marks the tenth anniversary of the adoption of resolution 1624 (2005) and the establishment of CTED.

With regard to the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), on measures to prevent the acquisition of weapons by terrorist groups, Venezuela would like to draw attention to the process of the ongoing comprehensive review, which aims to assess the work done by this subsidiary body since 2011 and which should conclude in November 2016. We wish to make the following comments and recommendations in that regard.

The intergovernmental conference to be held in June 2016 with the participation of Member States of the General Assembly should be understood as a key component and its results should be part of the review. Looking forward towards the review process and as a general practice, the Committee should expand its outreach activities throughout the headquarters of the bodies responsible for disarmament at the United Nations, namely, New York, Geneva and Vienna.

As part of the review process, we should consider in particular the Committee's work in the area of international assistance and technology transfer. Ways to optimize the matching of donor and recipient countries should be considered. The priorities of the countries requesting assistance should be the basis for cooperation. In that regard, Venezuela recalls that in previous years there was discussion of the possibility of holding an international conference to promote international assistance and technology transfer in the scope of the 1540 Committee. We fully support that initiative and would like to know if it is still being considered.

Finally, in recognizing the importance of resolution 1540 (2004) in the efforts to prevent the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist groups, Venezuela believes that eliminating and controlling these weapon systems, in particular nuclear weapons, is the best guarantee to prevent non-State actors from obtaining those weapons of destruction. We regret that the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons held in May was unable to adopt a final document, owing to the negative attitude of some countries with regard to realizing the commitment agreed upon in 1995 on the convening of the conference on a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction.

Mr. Oyarzun Marchesi (Spain) (*spoke in Spanish*): I shall now speak in my capacity as Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). Instead of reading out the long and detailed report being circulated in the Chamber now, I will give a brief summary highlighting its main ideas.

I do not need to explain to anyone the proliferation risks we face today. Now more than ever, non-State actors and terrorist groups are prepared to use chemical and biological weapons and even nuclear weapons and extreme violence. The global threat affects us all, and all States must comply with resolution 1540 (2004). All States are threatened.

I have not been Chair of the 1540 Committee for very long — only since 1 January. However, I assure the Council that my Mission's team, in cooperation with all Security Council members, has tried to do its best. I will highlight five relevant aspects of the 1540 Committee since the last report was presented (see S/PV.7319).

First is the system of reporting. At present, 174 States have submitted their reports. In other words, 90 per cent of Member States have submitted the basic reports on their structures for the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. However, despite the importance of the basic reports, it is crucial that States also submit the so-called additional reports, which are voluntary and make it possible for us to get a more detailed and more realistic idea of what is happening in the area of non-proliferation. It is also very important that States carry out the so-called national action plans, which are completely voluntary, but nonetheless very useful.

Secondly, I would like to underscore the national focal points, which resolution 1540 (2004) provides for. They are absolutely fundamental to our work. A training course for national focal points has been provided so that they may better carry out their functions.

Thirdly, we are trying to improve the system of assistance to strengthen the national capacity of States that request assistance to raise the levels of compliance with resolution 1540 (2004). We are working with regional and international organizations to that end.

Fourthly, with regard to outreach, it is important that the 1540 Committee maintain direct contact with Member States. We are working as well to encourage the participation of the 19 States that have not yet presented their regular reports. We have stepped up contacts with regional and international organizations to that end. One good example is the recent visit I made as Chair of the 1540 Committee to Vienna, where I met senior officials of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, among other agencies.

Lastly, with regard to transparency, transparency and outreach are vital for the effective implementation of the resolution. The Committee is therefore looking for better ways of using social networks, social media and other means of communication. For example, we now issue quarterly Chair messages to the entire network related to the 1540 Committee.

I should now like to touch upon the comprehensive review of the status of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). I reiterate that the full text of my statement that has been distributed contains a much more detailed explanation.

First, as Chair of the 1540 Committee, I have taken good note of the interesting comments and observations made by the delegation of Venezuela. In the opinion of the Committee, the comprehensive review should be retrospective. Above all, however, it also should look towards the future. It should be based on an analysis of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) on the basis of the review carried out in 2009. The aim should be to improve effectiveness and implementation on the part of Member States. It is important to note that, on 28 April, the Committee agreed on a modalities document — which is available on the website — that details the comprehensive review process. Let me highlight a few highlights of the process.

First, the Committee will analyse the data included in the reports presented by States and provide an overview on the status of the implementation of the resolution and the major implementation trends since 2009. That analysis will make it possible for us to introduce improvements.

Secondly, the Committee will look into its role in matchmaking and requests and offers assistance, while considering ways to ensure that such assistance is provided promptly.

Thirdly, as part of the comprehensive review process, we will seek ways of improving the Committee's cooperation with international organizations related to the scope of the 1540 Committee's work. When it comes to regional organizations, we should identify better ways to support them in order to set up networks of focal points for the 1540 Committee — as I mentioned earlier, for example, by instituting training courses.

Lastly, the review should also focus on the work of outreach using publications and other means of communication in a timely fashion. We are preparing a work calendar for the review prior to December 2016, which will of course include opportunities to hear the views of all Member States, as well as for the holding of consultations with international organizations and civil society. I call on all Council Member States, as well as non-Member States, to contribute to this important process.

In conclusion, I wish to thank all those who provided support to the Committee and made it possible to carry out its programme of work, either through voluntary and financial contributions — such as by Andorra, Kazakhstan, Norway, the Republic of Korea and the United States of America — or by organizations such as the European Union and private foundations such as the Carnegie Corporation of New York. I also wish to give very special thanks to the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs for its constant support.

Mr. Mangaral (Chad) (*spoke in French*): I would like to the thank Ambassadors Gerard van Bohemen of New Zealand, Raimonda Murmokaitė of Lithuania and Román Oyarzun Marchesi of Spain — respectively as Chairs of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011), concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities; the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001), concerning Counter-Terrorism; and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), on non-proliferation — for their briefings. We welcome their leadership as Chairs of those Committees.

While it is true that everybody is concerned about putting an end to terrorism, it is also true that the best way of achieving this is not to contribute to it. We think that, in order to eliminate terrorism it is important, among other things, to settle conflicts and to destroy terrorist safe havens and cut off their supplies, especially in terms of arms and ammunition. Chad, which yesterday experienced three deadly attacks in

its capital, condemns terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. It calls upon the Security Council to take urgent measures against the illicit provision of arms and ammunition to non-State actors, and to terrorist groups in particular.

With regard to the threat posed by Al-Qaida and its affiliated persons and entities, this is constantly growing. Organizations, such as the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the Al-Nusra Front, Boko Haram and others are conquering whole swaths of territories. The flow of foreign terrorist fighters recruited through the Internet and social networks to go to Iraq, Syria, Libya and other countries it taking on a very worrying dimension, while the human cost of the attacks perpetrated by those groups is enormous. Several welcome actions have been taken into order to curb the terrorist threat. In that regard, I should like to welcome the adoption of resolutions 2161 (2014), 2170 (2014), 2178 (2014), 2195 (2014), 2199 (2015), 2214 (2015) and 2220 (2015). I also commend the fact that the relevant Committees have submitted reports on ISIL, the Al-Nusra Front and foreign terrorist fighters. We very much look forward to the next report of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011), concerning Libya, because we are particularly concerned by the presence of terrorists groups linked to Daesh in the south of the country, bordering Chad, and also by the terrorist threat in the whole of the Sahel region.

It is also important to continue to list individuals and entities that fall under sanctions. The Committee must continue to update this list regularly. Nonetheless, we commend the Committee for its 2014 triennial review and we would encourage States to provide information for the 2015 triennial review. We welcome the important role of the Ombudsperson, Ms. Kimberley Prost, the Al-Qaida Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, as well as of the Coordinator, Mr. Alexander Evans. We thank them all for their reports. We hope that their successors will be selected and appointed taking into consideration a geographical representation as broad as possible, in line with article 101 of the Charter of the United Nations.

With regard to the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001), concerning counter-terrorism, Chad welcomes the work done by the Committee in response to the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters. We take note of the three reports that the Committee to the Council during this year and we would recommend it to focus further on managing, controlling and securing borders. We also note that since 2005 the Committee has visited more than half of the Member States. Such visits are crucial to following up the implementation of anti-terrorist measures, in particular resolutions 1373 (2001), 1624 (2005) and 2178 (2014). They help to facilitate technical assistance and to reinforce the capacity of States to counter the terrorist threat. That is why we encourage the Committee to continue to undertake country visits. Nonetheless, we would suggest recruiting experts at the national or regional levels, over and beyond those recruited in New York, so as to avoid very costly trips for them. We welcome the fact that the Committee has adopted an approach based on risk that aims to strengthen and build capacity based on the abilities of each State. We agree with the Chair of the Committee to recommend that each State should design its anti-terrorist strategies based on its own security problems.

In addition to country visits, we also encourage high-level visits. In that regard, we welcome the trip made by the Chair of the Committee to Mali and the Niger, along with the Executive Director of the Committee, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General to the Sahel and the African Union Special Representative for Counter-Terrorism Cooperation. In future, it would be desirable if those Committee members who so request could participate in such missions in their respective geographical areas. We encourage the holding of special meetings away from New York, following the example of the one to be held in Madrid in July 2015, and we propose the organization of another such meeting in Africa in coordination with the African Union.

With regard to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), concerning the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, we take note of the progress in the implementation of that resolution since November 2014 and of the submission by the Committee to the Council of its review of such implementation for 2014 and its programme of work for 2015. We welcome the efforts of Member States to implement the resolution and note that 174 countries, or 90 per cent of States, have presented reports to the Committee on steps they have taken in that regard. In addition, a large number of States have submitted voluntary national action plans for such implementation.

Much, however, remains to be done for the universal implementation of the resolution, and we therefore

encourage the Committee to enhance the role of the national focal points and to improve its system for the facilitation of assistance to States. We also encourage the organization of country visits and workshops and cooperation with international and regional organizations. We hope that the comprehensive review of the implementation of the resolution, expected at the end of 2016, will give impetus to such implementation, and note in that regard that the Committee has already agreed on four themes for the production of the review and that a work plan is under development.

With regard to cooperation and coordination among the three Security Committees established to combat terrorism and their Expert Groups, it is essential to fight together against threats to international peace and security resulting from terrorist acts and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors. We note in particular the participation of the Expert Groups in various workshops, communication activities, country visits, cooperation with international, regional and subregional organizations and exchanges of information since November 2014.

We welcome the establishment by the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) and the Group of Experts supporting the Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) of a shared focal point for the Caribbean, and the cooperation regarding terrorist financing and the freezing of terrorist assets between the Executive Directorate and the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1526 (2004), concerning Al-Qaida. In that regard, we welcome the joint observations they made to Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania during the preparation of those countries' laws on the implementation of resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1373 (2001), particularly in relation to the freezing of assets and the implementation of financial measures.

Lastly, Chad would like to thank Ambassadors Van Bohemen, Oyarzun Marchesi and Murmokaitė, and assures them of its cooperation with the Committees that they chair. We encourage the three Committees to enhance their cooperation and coordination. Chad calls upon all States to work in good faith to combat violent extremism and terrorism.

Mr. Lucas (Angola): At the outset, on behalf of the Angolan delegation, I would like to commend the Malaysian presidency for the initiative of convening this meeting with the Chairs of the three Security Council subsidiary organs responsible for countering terrorism, whom we welcome.

The holding of this meeting less than a month after the 29 May debate on the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters (see S/PV.7453) is a reflection of our collective commitment to combating the threat posed by terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. Terrorism is a global threat. It affects all continents and peoples. Contemporary terrorism is the most evil and sinister product of globalization. We are aware that a global effort such as the one conducted by the United Nations in cooperation with international, regional and subregional organizations is absolutely needed to counter terrorism more effectively.

Specifically on our continent, Africa, terrorism is spreading extensively and dangerously: Boko Haram in Nigeria and in the Lake Chad Basin; Al-Qaida and affiliates in the Maghreb; Ansar Al-Sharia and the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in Libya; Al-Shabaab in Somalia; the myriad terrorist groups affecting the Sahel region; and terrorists in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mali. A disturbing situation has emerged in Africa, with terrorists threatening peace and stability all over the continent.

As underlined in the briefing by the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011), concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, the human cost of Al-Qaida, ISIL and other terrorist-related attacks is immense and tragic, be it in the Middle East, in Africa, in Central Asia, in the Far East or in Europe. The Security Council has devised appropriate responses to this threat by expanding the work of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) and its Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team through the reporting on oil and the financing of terrorism, ISIL, the Al-Nusra Front and foreign terrorist fighters.

As terrorism grows, the Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) has increased the number of individuals and entities it has designated as associated with Al-Qaida. The observation by the Chair of the Committee that listings should be strategic, targeted and implementable and should have a practical effect and focus on targeting

individuals and entities that can be disrupted is appropriate for ensuring the sanctions' effectiveness.

Sanctions alone, however, are not enough to win the fight against terrorism. We must strengthen global, international, regional and subregional cooperation, reinforce national capabilities at all levels and devise creative ways of conducting an ideological struggle to fight extremism and youth radicalization, to denounce, isolate, degrade and successfully defeat the threat posed by terrorism.

Still concerning the Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011), we share the concerns expressed by the Committee's Chair regarding the end of the mandates of the Ombudsperson and the Monitoring Team Coordinator. We hope that the changing of the guard will take place in a smooth manner, in view of the crucial role of those mandates in enabling the Committee to respond effectively to the threat posed by Al-Qaida and affiliates.

We recognize the role that the United Nations has assumed globally, its outstanding leadership in the effort to combat terrorism through the relevant resolutions of the Security Council on the issue, the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) and Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate. The recent ministerial-level open debate on terrorism, and specifically on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2178 (2014), adopted in September 2014, and the steps taken by Member States and the international community to prevent the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters, was an important instance in Security Council action and international cooperation to counter this most undesirable development in international life.

We encourage and support the Security Council's efforts to foster closer cooperation and coordination among the Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011), the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001), the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), their respective Expert Groups and the main specialized agencies on counter-terrorism, such as the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate, the Monitoring Teams and the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force.

To conclude, the risk of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to non-State actors poses a serious threat to international peace and security. We encourage and support the Security Council's efforts to strengthen cooperation and effective coordination between the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and the overall framework established to counter terrorism. We express our support for the press statement on the comprehensive review of the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).

Mr. Rycroft (United Kingdom): I welcome this opportunity to review the Council's subsidiary bodies on counter-terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and the sanctions regime against Al-Qaida and its affiliates. I thank our briefers for the comprehensive overview they have just given and the hard work they do on our behalf alongside their day jobs representing their countries on the Council.

As so many recent terrorist atrocities have shown, we now face threats to international peace and security that our predecessors would scarcely have imagined when writing the Charter of the United Nations, 70 years ago. Attacks like the one attempted against tourists in Egypt just last week showed that our citizens can now be targeted wherever they are in the world. Such threats destroy lives and fundamentally challenge our collective efforts to preserve stability and further development across the globe. The work of the three Committees forms a vital part of the global response. Together, we can stop dangerous individuals from travelling abroad to perpetrate those heinous acts. We can freeze their assets and halt their financing of terror, and we can help deny them access to an even more dangerous arsenal of dirty bombs and chemical weapons. The Committees and their United Nations experts are therefore a crucial tool and a resource for the Council. I reiterate the United Kingdom's full support for their work. Let me now address each Committee in turn.

First, with respect to the Counter-Terrorism Committee, chaired by Raimonda, we welcome the recent reporting by the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate on foreign terrorist fighters and other issues. Such analysis helps all Member States understand the global risk we face and builds our collective will for global action. As we heard in last month's Council debate (see S/PV.7453), countering extremists' narratives is a major challenge for us all. We welcome the Committee's expanding focus on that issue and trust that countering violent extremism will remain a priority for the Committee in future. We look

forward to the Committee's adding to the plan of action to prevent violent extremism recently announced by the Secretary-General. We hope it will include clear metrics for success and quick-win capacity-building ideas.

Secondly, with respect to the Committee that Gerard chairs, let me reiterate support for the work of the Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee. That regime remains a key tool for the Security Council to disrupt the sickening activities of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and Al-Qaida groups. But to do so, all States need to fulfil their obligations under the terms of the regime, and the list needs to remain agile to evolving threats. We therefore commend the work of the Al-Qaida Monitoring Team and the analysis it shared with the Council, including its most recent in-depth report on foreign terrorist fighters (S/2015/358). That report gave the Council a valuable understanding of the sheer scale of foreign terrorist flows: an estimated 25,000 fighters originating from over half the United Nations Members. Fair and clear procedures for the sanctions regime are also needed to keep the list effective and current. We join the Chair in thanking Kimberly Prost for her sterling service as Ombudsperson. Her work has helped to maintain the legitimacy and effectiveness of that important tool.

Thirdly, let me turn to non-proliferation and resolution 1540 (2004), the Committee chaired by Román. The threat of non-State actors, particularly terrorists, acquiring weapons of mass destruction is a nightmare scenario for us all. Today's complex conflicts and rapidly evolving technology make effective implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) an imperative if we are to reduce the chance of that ever happening. I would like to take this opportunity to thank the 1540 Group of Experts and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs for their tireless work in helping States comply with the resolution. But more needs to be done. We urge all States to approach the Committee to offer or request support for national implementation. And to those 19 States that have yet to provide a national implementation report, let us be clear in our call to them to do so.

We also look forward to starting work on the comprehensive work of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) under the leadership of Spain. We invite all United Nations States Members to consider how the Committee's work can be strengthened, including through implementation, monitoring, assistance, matchmaking and outreach.

I was pleased to hear today's briefing on the growing cooperation among these three important subsidiary bodies. When resources are limited, joint activities such as country visits can save money and add value. We welcome further innovations such as those in future.

Mr. Adamu (Nigeria): I thank Ambassadors Murmokaitė, Van Bohemen and Oyarzun Marchesi for their insightful briefings.

Nigeria notes with appreciation the wide range of actions taken in the past six months by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001), concerning counter-terrorism, with the support of other United Nations counter-terrorism bodies, particularly the Executive Directorate of the Counter-Terrorism Committee. Such efforts have bolstered international capability and capacity to fight the menace of terrorism. Indeed, the three reports rendered by the Committee this year will not only enhance ongoing efforts by Member States in the implementation of resolution 2178 (2014), but will also help combat the disturbing phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters.

Nigeria remains steadfastly committed to United Nations counter-terrorism efforts. That is why President Mohammedu Buhari, in his capacity as the Chair of the African Union Peace and Security Council, on 13 June underscored Nigeria's commitment to comprehensively address the scourge of global terrorism. He also provided assurances that the campaign against the menace of the Boko Haram insurgency would be conducted in consonance with extant human rights and humanitarian law.

We welcome the country visits undertaken by the Counter-Terrorism Committee, which have not only provided vital information but have also ensured effective gap assessments. Indeed, we expect that they will contribute immensely to the work of the Committee. We look forward to the Committee's proposed follow-up visits in October.

With regard to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, we reiterate the need for all States to continue to take resolute and effective measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, in consonance with the essence of resolution 1540 (2004).

In our collective quest for the maintenance of international peace and security, we must intensify our efforts to ensure that non-State actors, including terrorists, are prevented from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. We believe that the goal of non-proliferation will be incrementally attained when requests for assistance are matched by commensurate offers. The decision of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) to strengthen its cooperation with other Committees, as well as with international, regional and subregional organizations, will no doubt enhance the achievement of its mandate. A multidimensional approach, as exemplified in the collaboration with the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, will serve as a viable means for achieving the objective of the resolution.

In our view, reporting remains a vital element of the Committee's work. As it commences its comprehensive review of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), we expect that concrete steps will be taken to achieve the goal of promoting the universality of the submission of first reports by States that have yet to do so. In addition, we want to encourage the Committee to explore other forms of assistance that would ensure reporting under the resolution. That would be accelerated by the continuing collaboration between its Group of Experts and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. Through regional offices, it is possible to engage and assist Member States on the submission of their initial reports.

Mr. Bertoux (France) (*spoke in French*): Allow me, at the outset, to thank the Ambassadors of Spain, New Zealand and Lithuania for their briefings and for the leadership of the Committees they respectively chair.

Terrorism remains an extremely present threat, as we are reminded by the all too frequent attacks that are currently taking place. I am especially thinking about the terrible attacks in N'Djamena yesterday, which we condemn in no uncertain terms, and wish to assure our colleagues in Chad of our complete support in this challenge.

As emphasized by the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011), concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, last year was characterized by the proliferation of crises linked to Al-Qaida and its affiliates, the emergence of Daesh, the ongoing actions of Boko Haram, the spread of radicalization, which the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters illustrates, and the situation in Libya. The Committee remains fully mobilized on those topics through the consideration of reports of the Monitoring Team requested by Security Council resolutions.

While the threat remains at a very high level, it is crucial that the sanctions list continues to best reflect terrorist threats. We would therefore encourage all United Nations States Members to continue to submit listing requests to the Committee. Furthermore, we encourage the members of the Committee to take very seriously requests from Member States noting allegations of violations. Violations of the sanctions regime harm its effectiveness and clout. The Committee has a responsibility to implement the regime, and therefore cannot simply say it has received the information. It must act. France is determined to work for respect for the sanctions regime.

For the list to be credible and to be up to date with regard to the threat, the delisting mechanism must be effective and must respect the fundamental rights of the persons listed. The establishment by resolution 1904 (2009) of the Office of the Ombudsperson in that mechanism was, in that connection, an unprecedented step by the Council to improve procedural guarantees. I would like to commend the exceptional work of the Ombudsperson of the Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, Ms. Kimberly Prost, who was able to give this function the stature that it requires. We deeply regret her departure and wish her much success in her future career.

The Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001), concerning counter-terrorism has a difficult task. Facing a multifaceted threat, it must be able to adapt its work in order to continue to best inform States of new threats. In that regard, we welcome the fact that the Committee closely monitors new threats linked to terrorism and regularly organizes public meetings in order to draw the attention of all Member States to those threats. With regard to combating foreign terrorists fighters, it is particularly useful to see the Committee working on the issue of travellers' data, that is, the advance passenger information system. Moreover, it is important that the Committee continue its work in the fight against violent extremism and its prevention. In addition, the Committee has the responsibility to review the way in which States implement not only resolution 1373 (2001), but also

many other resolutions— in particular resolutions 1624 (2005) and 2178 (2014).

It is crucial for States to accept visits by the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate in order to audit their systems in the fight against terrorism. That is in fact in their own interests. France recently received a visit by the Executive Directorate. It enabled them not only to take stock of our national system in this area, but also to identify good practices. In the past few months, France adopted new legislation aimed at curbing the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters. Based on those evaluations, technical assistance programmes need to be implemented by the United Nations for Member States. Therefore, we deem it crucial for the Executive Directorate to continue to work closely with other United Nations bodies responsible for combatting terrorism in order to ensure the realization of this type of project.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles, as well as the risk of these falling into the hands of terrorist groups, continues to present a real danger to international peace and security. The Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) plays a key role in combating that danger. The 1540 Committee is at a pivotal point with the commencement of the overall review of the Committee, which will have to be completed by the end of 2016. Next year will be doubly important for reinforcing the international non-proliferation architecture, with the holding of the Nuclear Security Summit, in anticipation of which France has already made proposals.

Much progress has been made since the adoption of resolution 1540 (2004). An overwhelming majority of Member States have already translated the provisions of the resolution into their domestic legislation and have taken measures to decrease the risks of proliferation. We also commend the efforts made by the Committee and the Group of Experts to put States requiring technical assistance in contact with those able to provide that assistance — a matter that France considers particularly important.

Much remains to be done. After more than 10 years of implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), there are many lessons still to be learned in order to improve our collective work. We have confidence in the comprehensive review process that began a short while ago, and today we mark that with the issuance of a press statement. The goal is to make the work of the Committee more effective, and thus to intensify the crucial fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Ms. Sison (United States of America): The United States would like to thank the Chairs of the three Committees, the Ambassadors of Spain, Lithuania and New Zealand, for their briefings.

I would like to start with some observations on the Committee established pursuant to resolutionin 1540 (2004). We congratulate Spain for its active leadership role since assuming the Chair in January — particularly its focus on planning for the comprehensive review. The fact that 174 countries have submitted national reports since the resolution came into effect, in 2004, is a strong testament to the global effort to prevent non-State actors from acquiring and using weapons of mass destruction. We believe that the Committee's efforts have prompted States to take measures that will lead to improved implementation of resolution 1540 (2004).

The United States views monitoring the status of implementation as the most important task of the Committee, as it creates a solid foundation on which depend all the rest of the work of the Committee and our efforts to foster the full implementation of the resolution through effective assistance efforts. In that regard, we appreciate the work of the Committee and its Group of Experts to revise the matrices of all United Nations States Members, which is nearly complete. We welcome the response to the Committee's efforts to increase its direct engagement with States, which we believe has produced an increase in submissions of new and additional 1540 national implementation reports, particularly in the form of national action plans and effective national practices.

Since the last Council briefing on this topic (see S/PV.7331), the United States has continued to strengthen its efforts to combat proliferation. Notably, the United States has moved towards the ratification of four important international non-proliferation instruments, namely, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and two protocols to the Convention for the Suppression on Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation. We urge all Member States to cooperate with the 1540 Committee in supporting the review. With regard to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the United States remains unwavering in its support for the NPT and for achieving the peace

and security of a world without nuclear weapons. The lack of a consensus final document at the latest Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty does not change that central fact or the role the Treaty will continue to play in promoting global security.

Turning to counter-terrorism, I must stress that, despite the significant blows to Al-Qaida's leadership, terrorist threats persist around the world. We are also deeply concerned about the evolution of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the emergence of groups that have pledged allegiance to ISIL in Libya, Egypt, Nigeria, Afghanistan and elsewhere, and the tens of thousands of foreign terrorist fighters who exacerbate conflicts and then return to pose a threat to their home countries. Against that backdrop, resolution 2178 (2014) has special importance, because it created a new legal and policy framework to counter foreign terrorist fighters.

As part of our ongoing follow-up, we look forward to the special high-level meeting of the Counter-Terrorism Committee and the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) technical meetings that Spain will host in Madrid in late July. We expect the meetings to highlight effective ways to prevent recruitment; improve border controls and information sharing; criminalize, prosecute or rehabilitate foreign terrorist fighters; and boost momentum for providing technical assistance where it is needed.

The United States welcomed the announcement that later this year the Secretary-General would present to the General Assembly a plan of action for preventing violent extremism, which we hope will establish the important role the United Nations can play in that area. For the United Nations to successfully counter such threats, the various parts of the Organization's system have to be able to work well together. We also welcome the efforts of CTED, the close partner of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team of the Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011), concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, to focus on its core mandate of providing analyses and assessments of counter-terrorism capacity-building gaps and serving as an essential facilitator for matching donors with recipients. In that context, we urge CTED and the Monitoring Team to work closely with the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, which has a central role in coordinating efforts with the 34 United Nations counter-terrorism entities and INTERPOL in helping to build Member States' counter-terrorism capacity.

That leads me to the important role of the Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee. Bolstering implementation must be the Committee's first priority. We have to prevent ISIL and other terrorists from travelling internationally, acquiring weapons and raising money to fund acts of terrorism. As part of that, the Committee and its Monitoring Team must continue to explore ways to deal with non-compliance. We are therefore encouraged that they are continuing to engage with States in identifying situations where sanctions are not being implemented. When the issue of non-compliance involves a lack of capacity, we should support efforts to strengthen Member States' legal and technical capacities. When the cause of non-compliance is a lack of political will, the Committee's Chair can be helpful by engaging States — privately, if necessary — in order to educate them on the usefulness of that tool for their national and regional counter-terrorism strategies.

In addition, we would also like to thank the outgoing Ombudsperson, Kimberly Prost, for her five years of dedicated, active and outstanding service, her integrity and her emphasis on due process. We are also grateful for the Monitoring Team's important work and particularly appreciative of the many efforts of its outgoing Coordinator, Alexander Evans. The Team has done a superb job of documenting and analysing challenges from ISIL and foreign terrorist fighters, and has provided actionable recommendations for tackling them.

Mr. Hmoud (Jordan) (*spoke in Arabic*): I would like to begin by thanking the Chairs of the three Committees for their briefings, which illustrated the very constructive role they play in the fight against the threat that terrorism poses to international peace and security.

Despite all the international community's efforts, including those of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, that threat is growing, and in recent years we have seen the emergence of groups affiliated with Al-Qaida, as well as of dissident organizations such as Daesh. They now control large expanses of territory and are a threat to international peace and security, putting in jeopardy all the efforts deployed by the international community and the United Nations. We must therefore be able to transparently assess the work being done in order to understand the course we should take in the future. Needless to say, that should in no way detract

from the achievements of previous years, but we must be aware of the dangers coming from unconventional, non-traditional sources. We must make effective decisions that accord with the Charter of the United Nations and with international law in order to deal with this phenomenon.

Concerning the Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011), concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, we would like to emphasize its central role and that of the sanctions system. The Committee plays an important part in reducing the threat posed by Al-Qaida as well as in implementing the various relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolutions 1989 (2011), 1373 (2001) and 1540 (2004). In that regard, we stress the importance of including on the list all those meeting the criteria outlined in resolution 1989 (2011), ensuring countries' full respect for the sanctions system and keeping the sanctions list properly updated and ensuring its fairness and transparency. That can be done by continually reviewing listed countries and the delisting requests submitted to the Ombudsperson. Besides that, there is the updating of the work of the Committee's Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, which depends on the cooperation of the various countries concerned. In that context, I would like to commend the role of the Monitoring Team and the Office of the Ombudsperson.

Concerning the work of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), the military capacity of terrorist organizations, the increase in their financing sources and their control of large areas of territory all render their use of non-traditional weapons very real and possible, so it is crucial that countries fully comply with the provisions of resolution 1540 (2004). We welcome the fact that the resolution is scheduled for a comprehensive review. We have great expectations for the review and its examination of the gaps in the resolution's implementation. It is vital that we make use of that analysis to strengthen the role of the Committee and to fill those gaps.

Jordan considers the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) extremely important, particularly in the context of the current conditions in the Arab region. At the beginning of this month we hosted a workshop for 17 Arab countries and 11 representatives of regional and international organizations, as well as representatives of civil society, in a demonstration of my country's willingness to ensure the review's success and to help other Arab States to confront the challenge of terrorism and terrorist organizations' ability to access weapons of mass destruction.

The Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001), concerning counter-terrorism, and its Executive Directorate (CTED) plays a very important part in fighting terrorism. I would specifically like to highlight the work of CTED with regard to foreign terrorist fighters. In that context, the meeting to be held in Madrid at the end of July is very important. The Committee's role should be to help assess countries' ability to implement the resolution and to assist them in strengthening their counter-terrorism abilities. We call on CTED to adopt such a strategy and to report to the Committee on the assistance programme it administers.

I would now like to share some thoughts on the work of the Counter-Terrorism Committee. The fight against terrorism calls for a joint effort. Many countries that wish to implement resolution 1373 (2001) are hampered by a lack of capacity. Providing assistance and filling the gaps for those countries should become a comprehensive part of the Committee's work. Such work should be strengthened, and we should not forget the Committee's role as a catalyst so that international and technical organizations are encouraged to provide assistance to the countries that require it.

We reaffirm the importance of cooperation and coordination among the three Committees. We warmly welcome the provisions to improve coordination among them as described by the Chair of the 1540 Committee. While they have the necessary political support for their roles, they sometimes lack sufficient financial resources to provide the necessary assistance. It will be essential to bolster the capacity of the Committees and their executive prerogatives with the provision of financial resources.

Fourthly, the Committees should maintain ongoing relationships and cooperate with the countries most seriously affected by terrorism by strengthening links with the permanent delegations, conducting visits and meeting with the authorities of those countries.

Fifthly, we must respond in a comprehensive way to the challenges that terrorism poses. Terrorist groups may have different persuasions, but they share the same obscurantist way of thinking. Therefore, whether they intend to or not, they help each other. We must focus on all terrorist organizations for that very reason.

Lastly, Jordan will continue playing its pioneering, central role in the fight against terrorism. We have responded to the phenomenon with all the means at our disposal, and we have strengthened our cooperation with the Security Council Committees and all the relevant United Nations bodies.

Mr. Wang Min (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): I wish to thank Ambassador Oyarzun Marchesi, Ambassador Van Bohemen and Ambassador Murmokaité for their briefings. The Non-Proliferation Committee, the Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee and the Counter-Terrorism Committee have made positive efforts in carrying out their respective work under the leadership of the three Ambassadors, for whom China expresses its appreciation.

Today, the world faces severe challenges in combating terrorism. Regional conflicts provide the breeding ground for terrorists and extremist organizations with new forms of terrorist tactics. Terrorism is the common enemy of all humankind. The international community should work closely together to crack down on it. Concerning what to do next, I would like to emphasize the following points.

First, international counter-terrorism operations require that the United Nations and the Security Council fully play a leading role and adhere to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the relevant countries, make extensive efforts to develop consensus among Member States and carry out coordinated and consistent actions. Regardless of what form it takes, when or where it occurs and whom it targets, we should take a tough position on combating terrorism. There should be no double standards and nor should terrorism be seen as being linked to any specific ethnic group or religion.

Secondly, today the international non-proliferation process faces new and complex situations. More non-State actors are engaging in proliferation activities. In terms of international non-proliferation efforts, we still have a long way to go. Faced with new challenges, the international community should tighten control on the source of the problem, eliminate the root causes of such proliferation and take a balanced approach to address security and development. Countries should be committed to implementing resolution 1540 (2004) in a comprehensive and balanced manner to prevent non-State actors, especially terrorists, from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, and countries should step up international security. China hopes that, through the review process, the Committee will further raise countries' awareness to implement the resolution and promote a more important role for the Committee in international cooperation, assistance and other areas.

Thirdly, China has noted that the number of foreign terrorist fighters has continued to increase in spite of the measures to stop them. They have been inflicting more and more harm, and their participation has intensified regional conflicts and made it more difficult to resolve problems. When foreign terrorist fighters return to their own countries, they constitute a serious threat to the security and stability of their home countries and regions. The United Nations and the relevant international organizations should establish a counter-terrorism database as soon as possible to share information resources so as to create conditions to effectively contain the transnational flow of foreign terrorist fighters.

Fourthly, a new task and challenge in our fight against terrorism is the need to crack down on terrorists' use of the Internet. The international community should take effective measures to respond to terrorist groups' use of the Internet to post violent audio and video content, disseminate extremist ideas, recruit, finance, incite, plan and carry out terrorist activities. All countries should effectively implement the relevant resolutions of the Council and strengthen their regulation of the Internet. We welcome the Counter-Terrorism Committee's plan to host a special meeting on the subject in November. We hope that the meeting can result in devising new ideas and measures.

Fifthly, China has consistently asserted that the international fight against terrorism requires a comprehensive approach aimed at eliminating root causes while addressing the symptoms, including in the political, security, economic, financial, information and ideological areas. The international community, while actively responding to new forms, developments and trends of terrorism, should also adopt effective measures to help regional countries advance their socioeconomic development, appropriately address regional conflicts and promote equal dialogue among diverse civilizations, religions and ethnic groups, so as to eliminate the recourses and breeding grounds for terrorism.

China is against terrorism in any form, and it has actively participated in international counter-terrorism cooperation and strictly implemented the

relevant Council resolutions. In November 2014, China held a symposium on strengthening international cooperation to prevent and counter terrorists' use of the Internet. In the second half of 2015, China will host a training course for Asian countries with the focus on resolution 1540 (2004), and it is maintaining effective communication with the Non-Proliferation Committee on relevant arrangements. China stands ready to work with members of the international community and to make a positive effort to advance international counter-terrorism cooperation in the joint effort to maintain world peace and security.

Mr. Barros Melet (Chile) (*spoke in Spanish*): We thank the Chairs of the Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, the Counter-Terrorism Committee and the Non-Proliferation Committee for their respective briefings.

Since the last joint briefing (see S/PV.7184) of those Committees to the Council in May 2014, the emergence of the terrorist group calling itself the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, the expansion of the Al-Nusra Front and the challenge posed by foreign terrorist fighters forced the Council to resolutely react to those threats. We welcome the Council meeting (see S/PV.7272) held on 24 September 2014, which led to the unanimous adoption of resolution 2178 (2014), which provides for the implementation of a series of measures to deal with foreign terrorist fighters. The success or failure of the international community against this scourge will depend on the efficient and effective cooperation of all stakeholders. In that regard, we fully support the work of the Counter-Terrorism Committee and its Executive Directorate, and we are committed to the forthcoming high-level conference in Madrid to stop the recruitment and flow of foreign terrorist fighters.

The effective fight against terrorism requires trust at all levels, which must be cultivated by sharing best practices and information to detect and dismantle terrorist-financing sources, such as the trafficking and illegal sale of oil and other natural resources, as well as the destruction and trafficking in cultural property, among others.

In this task we should not lose sight of respect for human rights and the rule of law. We emphasize the role played by the Office of the Ombudsperson in incorporating due process in the sanctions regime of the Al-Qaida Committee, as well as the independence of the Ombudsperson's work. Chile has reiterated that the post of the Ombudsperson should exist in all sanctions committees.

We must continue to respond quickly to new challenges while maintaining what we have done well, for example, in the Non-Proliferation Committee with regard to non-State actors.

The comprehensive review to be held next year on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) will be key to determine its progress. We see room for improvement in the dialogue with Member States. It is therefore important to identify deficiencies and areas requiring further attention.

Before concluding, I will make a few comments.

First, we are concerned about the excessive workload of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team of the Al-Qaida Committee. As the product of different resolutions, the Team must invest enormous human resources and work hours to respond to an increased demand for documentation, diverting its attention from the task originally entrusted to it.

Secondly, greater synergy in the work of these three Committees is required, as well as greater dialogue with Member States to facilitate cooperation and the necessary assistance to enhance national capacities.

Moreover, we are also concerned about the possible effect of the widespread use of the term "terrorism" and the fact that some international actors label opponents or the political opposition as terrorists.

Finally, terrorism and violence will not be defeated by military means alone. As noted by President Michelle Bachelet to the Security Council (see S/PV.7272), we must address its root causes. Undoubtedly, that is a long-term preventive task that we must undertake without delay.

Mr. Safronkov (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): The Russian Federation is grateful to the Chairs of the Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committees for their solid work during the reporting period. The reports issued by those bodies make an important contribution to strengthening international counter-terrorism cooperation under the auspices of the United Nations. That cooperation is particularly pertinent today, given the unprecedented growth of contemporary terrorist threats.

The epicenter of terrorist activity is currently Iraq and Syria, where radicals from the Islamic State

in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the Al-Nusra Front and other groups associated with Al-Qaida are operating. They are carrying out heinous acts of barbarism and are desecrating centuries-old cultural sites and undermining the very foundations of States. Attempts by ISIS to gain a foothold in Afghanistan and Libya, where it has already done terrible things to Egyptian Coptic Christians and Ethiopians, are also worrying.

We welcome the efforts of the Counter-Terrorism Committee and the Al-Qaida Commitee in the area of countering the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters. Resolution 2178 (2014) focuses on the Security Council's approach to combating that type of threat. We are convinced that the key to eradicating terrorism, including the foreign terrorist fighter phenomenon, may be found in combatting radicalization and the spread of extremist ideology. Particular attention should be paid to curbing the use by terrorists of modern information and telecommunication systems and technologies. We are in favour of expanding the work of the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), as well as that of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), in that area in line with the above-mentioned resolutions.

Curbing the financing of ISIS and Al-Nusra Front through the illegal trade in oil, precious metals and cultural artifacts in the area of Syria and Iraq is an important area of cooperation between United Nations counter-terrorism bodies. Resolution 2199 (2015) establishes a clear mechanism for ensuring accountability in implementing its provisions. However, the mechanism is not currently functioning at full capacity and, given the urgency of the problem, that is of serious concern.

We strongly urge Member States to regularly report steps taken to implement resolution 2199 (2015) to the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999). First and foremost, with regard to cases of illegal oil transactions, we trust that the forthcoming report of the Committee's Monitoring Team on the implementation of the resolution will contain specific and realistic proposals to increase the effectiveness of the implementation of this important Security Council resolution.

We urge the CTC to continue monitoring the implementation of the basic Security Council resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005). Priority should be given to States that are most subject to terrorist threats, inter alia, when planning country visits. We must renew the comprehensive reviews of the implementation of these resolutions.

The counter-terrorism capacity of States should be strengthened through targeted technical assistance. CTED's experience and methods for coordinating technical assistance, as well as the trust it has earned from States, puts CTED in a unique position. We expect that the joint work of CTED, the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force Office and the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre in the area of technical assistance, based on the provisions of the presidential statement (S/PRST/2013/11) of 29 May, will be effective.

The sanctions list of the 1267 Committee is one of the most effective tools for combatting terrorism, and it should appropriately reflect the threats stemming from Al-Qaida. The responsibility of the Ombudsperson, enshrined in resolution 2161 (2014), should ensure the greatest level of transparency for the Committee's work. We trust that the new expert who will assume that position will meet the advertised professional requirements as much as possible and will scrupulously assess the potential risks linked with delisting and carefully consider the opinions of interested and affected States.

The 1540 Committee, headed by the Permanent Representative of Spain, plays a leading role in coordinating international efforts in the area of non-proliferation. In our view, the main aim of the Committee and its Panel of Experts is to continue to ensure a decrease in the number of countries that have not submitted their first national reports on the implementation of this important resolution. Another very important aspect of its work is to carry out a comprehensive review of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). We agree that there is a need to analyse the Committee's experience in the area of cooperation with all organizations involved in the process, as well as the outreach programme for States and civil society. The purpose of the review should be to evaluate the effectiveness of such activities.

We should also focus attention on the advisability of having a differentiated approach to countries depending on the effectiveness of their implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). There is also a need to focus attention on those that need real assistance. Recommendations should be targeted so as to enable more efficient use of the by-no-means-unlimited resources of the 1540 Committee.

We consider it important to further strengthen contacts between the subsidiary organs of the Security Council and specialized agencies and mechanisms, so as to expand the network of counter-terrorism cooperation under the auspices of the United Nations. To that end, we note the cooperation between the Counter-Terrorism Committee and the 1267 and 1540 Committees with the international conference of heads of law-enforcement agencies and security services held by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation. We also welcome the participation of the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate in the World Bank meeting on the international database on combating terrorism. We would like to see a continuation of the practice of holding briefings among the heads of those conferences and representatives of the Counter-Terrorism Committee.

The United Nations has developed a solid international legal framework in the area of counter-terrorism and has created a set of effective tools. However, successful implementation will be possible only though coordinated and voluntary inter-State cooperation, without politicization, double standards, opportunistic approaches or differentiating between "good" and "bad" terrorists. It is such cooperation that we in the Russian Federation insist upon.

The President: I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of Malaysia.

I join earlier speakers in thanking the Chairs of the three subsidiary bodies for their respective presentations to the Council. Malaysia reaffirms its commitment to and support for the work of the subsidiary bodies of the Security Council, including the important work undertaken by the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities; the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism; and the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004).

We wish also to place on record our appreciation of the important role played by the 1267/1989 Monitoring Team, the Group of Experts, the Ombudsperson, the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) and other actors for their important contributions to and support for the Committees.

Malaysia's location, which straddles global shipping routes, and our status as a trading nation requires a clearly defined approach to the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). In living up to its commitment, Malaysia has put in place the necessary legal and policy framework, anchored in the Strategic Trade Act 2010. In order to ensure effective implementation at the domestic level, the Government held nationwide outreach programmes, including with the private sector and enforcement agencies. This approach resulted in an increased awareness of the progressing non-proliferation obligations, as well as higher levels of compliance from the private sector. As such, we see the merit in similarly targeted outreach activities by the Security Council Committees related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Malaysia has also undertaken initiatives at the regional and subregional levels to complement and strengthen international non-proliferation mechanisms. As current Chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Malaysia, together with Canada and New Zealand, hosted the 2015 ASEAN Regional Forum Intersessional Meeting on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. The two-day meeting, concluded in Kuala Lumpur earlier today, provided an opportunity for ASEAN and its partners to discuss, inter alia, the way forward following the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, international non-proliferation mechanisms and capacity-building in the area of WMD threat reduction.

In that regard, I am encouraged by the fact that the Chairs of the three Committees have underlined their commitment to coordinating on common regional approaches by taking into consideration geographical and political similarities. Malaysia has officially offered assistance through the 1540 Committee to other Member States. We will consider such requests in the areas of legal and regulatory infrastructure, implementation and resources for fulfilling the provisions of the resolutions. In that connection, we will support efforts to streamline the matchmaking mechanism between donor States and assistance providers so as to ensure the effective delivery of such assistance.

With regard to the work of the 1267/1989 Committee, my delegation joins others in thanking Mr. Alexander Evans, coordinator of the Monitoring Team, and the Team as a whole for bringing more energy and substantive focus to the Committee's work. We wish Mr. Evans all the best and look forward to working with his successor. Like others, we, too, look forward to receiving the report on the implementation

of resolution 2199 (2015). We note the increasing volume of listing and delisting requests addressed to the Ombudperson and the Focal Point for delisting. We hold the view that increased resort to those mechanisms indicates increased awareness and confidence in the sanctions mechanism.

Given the Ombudsperson's role in balancing security and human rights concerns, Malaysia continues to believe that there is scope to explore the possibility of extending such role and mandate for other sanctions Committees. On the Ombudsperson's mandate, it is important that the Council agree on the way forward in appointing Ms. Prost's successor.

In noting the excellent support for and cooperation with the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) by CTED, Malaysia commends the focus and concerted efforts initiated by the CTC geared towards the implementation of resolutions 2170 (2014), 2178 (2014) and 2199 (2015), on preventing the flow of foreign terrorist fighters, including the upcoming special meeting in Madrid to be hosted by Spain. We continue to believe that sharing information, to the extent possible, on the work of the sanctions Committees constitutes an important step towards building trust and confidence in the United Nations sanctions regime as a whole. In that regard, we remain supportive of the practice of open briefings by the Committee Chairs.

I now resume my functions as President of the Council.

The meeting rose at 6.35 p.m.

United Nations S/PV.7464

Security Council

Seventieth year

Provisional

7464th meeting
Wednesday, 17 June 2015, 10 a.m.
New York

President:	Mr. Ibrahim	(Malaysia)
Members:	Angola	Mr. Gimolieca
	Chad	Mr. Mangaral
	Chile	Mr. Barros Melet
	China	Mr. Wang Min
	France	Mr. Delattre
	Jordan	Mr. Hmoud
	Lithuania	Ms. Murmokaitė
	New Zealand	Mr. Van Bohemen
	Nigeria	Mr. Bosah
	Russian Federation	Mr. Iliichev
	Spain	Mr. González de Linares Palou
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Mr. Rycroft
	United States of America	Ms. Power
	Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	Mr. Ramírez Carreño

Agenda

United Nations peacekeeping operations

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The meeting was called to order at 10.05 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

United Nations peacekeeping operations

The President: In accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the following briefers to participate in this meeting: Mr. Hervé Ladsous, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations; Lieutenant General Yohannes Gebremeskel Tesfamariam, Force Commander of the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan; Major General Michael Lollesgaard, Force Commander of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali; and Major General Michael Finn, Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its the agenda.

I now give the floor to Mr. Ladsous.

Mr. Ladsous: I thank you, Mr. President, for the opportunity to hold this meeting with all of our Force Commanders, taking advantage of this encounter that takes place every year. This is a great opportunity to spend the whole week discussing with our military colleagues all the challenges that they face. Let me very clear, Mr. President: every single one of our Force Commanders has a story to tell — of courage and determination, but also of challenges. Those stories are a reality for which we should be grateful to them, because of the attitude that they display with the support of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and, in particular, the Office of Military Affairs. While each of them has a story to tell, we thought that this year it would be of particular interest to focus on three issues, which are so relevant to the situations that face us at the present time.

First, we will hear from Lieutenant General Yohannes Gebremeskel Tesfamariam, who, after being Force Commander in Abyei, is now performing the same duties in South Sudan, where he faces the tremendous challenges associated with the protection of civilians in situations that the Security Council knows too well. We will then hear from Major General Finn, who, as the Force Commander and Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, faces a context that has changed massively in what used to be a classic peacekeeping operation. However, in that aggravated situation, he faces the particular difficulty of the caveats imposed by troop-contributing countries. I think that is something useful that the Security Council could take into account.

Last but not least, we will hear from Major General Lollesgaard, who recently took command of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). That will draw attention to the issue of asymmetric threats, and the particular and very challenging environment that he experiences on a daily basis at the Mission. As members may remember, MINUSMA has experienced more casualties than any other operation in the past 20 years — which is quite revealing of modern-day peacekeeping.

I will say no more; each of the generals will make his points. Let me just take this opportunity to publicly thank them all very much once again for their commitment and their dedication to duties that have never been as difficult as they are nowadays.

The President: I thank Mr. Ladsous for his briefing.

I now give the floor to Lieutenant General Tesfamariam.

Lieutenant General Tesfamariam: I am honoured to be here today to discuss the protection of civilians in South Sudan, the primary task entrusted to the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). Let me start by expressing my deep appreciation to the Mission's personnel, who, under the able leadership of Ms. Ellen Margrethe Løj, the Secretary-General's Special Representative for South Sudan and Head of UNMISS, continue to work courageously to protect tens of thousands of civilians under the threat of physical violence, safeguard human rights and facilitate the work of the humanitarian community in delivering assistance to the millions of South Sudanese in need. I particularly thank the troop- and police-contributing countries that have provided much-needed uniformed personnel and assets.

In a situation of ongoing conflict such as that in South Sudan, where the parties and allied forces pay little heed to the laws of war, peacekeepers struggle to implement their protection-of-civilians mandate. The challenges facing UNMISS are numerous.

First, restrictions imposed by the parties on access and the freedom of movement fundamentally hamper even our most basic efforts to protect civilians. Both

sides continue to violate the status of forces agreement, while obstructing or delaying the movement of contingent-owned equipment and demanding illegal access. Furthermore, those bearing the primary responsibility for protecting civilians are themselves perceived as constituting threats to the safety of civilians.

Secondly, as we saw last month in Upper Nile state, UNMISS protection-of-civilians sites have increasingly been caught up in the crossfire. During the fighting in Melut on 19 May, the Mission base was hit by more than 20 artillery shells and stray bullets. Nine internally displaced persons (IDPs) were killed and 11 wounded. UNMISS has been engaging the leadership on all sides, urging them to cease combat operations and respect the inviolability of United Nations premises. UNMISS troops have also been taking reinforcement and surge measures to protect civilians seeking shelter and have been allowing for the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

Thirdly, we face the challenge to the Mission's efforts to protect vulnerable people, regardless of their location. Protecting civilians is not just about providing a secure static location, nor is it about demonstrating a static presence. Rather, our focus is on enabling the movement of civilians and proactively protecting them in their areas of origin, securing their traditional movements and enabling them to go about their livelihoods. The Mission has been projecting its presence outside its bases, conducting robust short- and long-duration patrols to deter violence against civilians, and proactively engaging vulnerable communities through the establishment of forward operating bases in Malakal, with plans to establish similar facilities in Bentiu and Bor, since the pull factor of our static protection sites cannot be ignored.

Some IDPs are encouraged to stay at the protection sites for an extended period of time because of the services provided. Since armed conflict broke out in December 2013, these sites have grown and continue to grow. There are now over 136,000 IDPs sheltering at seven protection-off-civilians sites. For many who have had no other choice than to seek protection, as well as for those who see them as access points for service delivery, the sites now provide a more convenient and secure place in which to live. We must assess the sustainability of this arrangement. Without a viable peace throughout the country, we must genuinely assess how long the Mission can, and should, provide protection to those currently inhabiting the sites.

Beyond those challenges, the successful implementation of the Mission's protection-of-civilians mandate requires effective command and control, steadfast commitment from the troops and sufficient resources. From a military standpoint, command and control is absolutely critical. The operational-level protection-of-civilians strategy must be delivered at the tactical level in contexts where days, and even weeks, can pass without direct contact between commanders and their subordinates. As peacekeepers in the field, the strategy is necessarily decentralized: the unit commanding officers have considerable freedom of action. As such, they are a key force enabler and a critical link in the protection-of-civilians chain. It is therefore essential that there be trust within the chain of command, as well as confidence that commanders' orders and intent are understood and will be implemented without fail.

The protection of civilians also presupposes a steadfast commitment to the safety and security of the people in one's area of operations. It is based on the understanding that those responsible for such protection are willing to take proactive measures and to put themselves between the threat and the civilians when required. Although an armoured unit may be technically capable of a military or police engagement, that technical capacity alone is not sufficient to protect civilians. I believe that willingness is a peacekeeping operation's greatest protection asset.

Lastly, the protection of civilians requires significant logistical, financial and human resources that fit the mandate, expectations and realities on the ground. The limitations that we face in that respect, particularly the absence of critical enablers such as close air support, adequate logistics, intelligence, reconnaissance and responsive casualty and medical evacuation capabilities, negatively affect our early warning and daily operations.

In conclusion, I should underline that the protection of civilians is a responsibility shared among key actors, including the international community and the host authorities. Success at the operational level depends upon well-trained and well-equipped troops who have the right mindset for deterring potential aggressors and reducing levels of violence. Passive forces invite aggression and manipulation, leading to increased

risks for all. Finally, successfully protecting civilians requires innovative leadership that translates into effective actions on the ground. The Security Council plays a key role in holding accountable those who harm civilians or directly obstruct our efforts to protect them.

The President: I thank Lieutenant General Tesfamariam for his briefing.

I now give the floor to Major General Lollesgaard.

Major General Lollesgaard: It is a great honour to speak in this forum on the subject of operating in an asymmetric environment. As the Council is aware, I command the force of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), and in answer to the question underlying the topic — whether or not MINUSMA is geared to operate in an asymmetric environment — I would say no, not really. I have some good assets, but overall there are some major shortfalls that make us extremely vulnerable.

Since Mali is often on the Council's agenda, I will not explain the threats and challenges in the country in detail. While we consider the Platform and the Coordination coalitions to consist of so-called compliant armed groups, it is primarily, but not only, the jihadist groups that are hostile to MINUSMA. Their preferred methods are improvised explosive devices (IEDs), suicide attacks, laying mines along our routes, ambushes and shelling our camps with rockets and mortars. The consequence is that MINUSMA has by far the most fatalities among United Nations mission troops, with 36 soldiers killed and more than 200 wounded since 2013, something that deeply concerns and upsets me.

We have a robust self-defence mandate for conducting peacekeeping in such an environment. However, we cannot, and should not, be mandated to conduct offensive operations against the threats we face. We are therefore limited to trying, mainly defensively, to protect the population and ourselves as well as we possibly can. In my opinion, that requires the ability to master three main functions. The first of those is understanding the environment — who, when, where, how and so on. Only through that understanding can we prevent attacks, either by influencing the leadership or deterring groups by being in the right spot. We also need strong situational awareness in order to monitor a ceasefire in such a vast country. Secondly, we have to reassure the population and convince them to believe in the possibility of a future without the armed groups. And while doing that, we must be able to protect ourselves.

It is with the first function, that of understanding, that we have the good news. In MINUSMA we have implemented a new intelligence concept — the All Sources Information Fusion Unit. In support of that I also have at my disposal special operations forces and helicopters. Accepting intelligence-gathering as an integrated function of our operations is a huge step forward in the United Nations modus operandi. I now have a number of sophisticated assets, including unmanned aerial vehicles, and a strong, centrally placed intelligence staff capable of doing the assessments. We have come a long way, and I am now definitely being provided with good, solid intelligence that helps me understand the environment. However, if we — the United Nations — continue to operate in such environments, we have to exploit that concept further. We need more intelligence-gathering assets at the lower levels and, most important, we need the staffing capacity to make better use of the intelligence. I am making a strong push for the full manning of all my headquarters with, importantly, the proper skills set. Intelligence is a priority.

The next function is reassuring and convincing the population. The best way to counter an asymmetric threat, of course, is to get the people's support. If the population believes in the alternative — in the peacekeeping force — they will be reluctant to support terrorists or other armed groups, including bandits, and eventually such groups could lose their hiding places. The Mission has a strong public information section that works effectively with the media, issuing communiqués, making radio news and so forth. But we need what I would call an information operation concept that combines all our messaging activities in a coordinated manner. Commanders and soldiers on the ground should talk and interact more closely with the population, talking about what we are doing, why we are there, what is going on and so forth. By combining those messages with quick-impact projects and other outreach activities, we will be able to create a positive perception of the force, and of what is an alternative to war, in a coordinated way. I am therefore happy to see that the first draft of MINUSMA's new mission concept actually mentions information operations. That is also why I have now established a small information operations cell in my planning section at force headquarters. We should exploit that concept further.

While working on understanding the environment, preventing attacks and convincing and reassuring the population — in a word, stabilizing the situation — we have to protect ourselves. Anything that moves by road in an environment as hostile as that in northern Mali has to be protected. That means protected against mines, and all units should be able to search for, detect and avoid mines and IEDs. It goes without saying that eight United Nations soldiers sitting in the open air on top of a soft Landcruiser pickup do not stand much of a chance if the vehicle is hit by a mine or IED. The same goes for unprotected civilian supply trucks. In short, we must make sure that any contingent operating in a hostile environment is well equipped with protected vehicles for troops operating outside the camps.

We should also provide well-protected camps with good living conditions, particularly when we set up camps in contested areas where troops conduct risky operations out of their camps on a daily basis. They need a safe haven to come home to. We can never achieve full protection against everything, but our troops deserve to be well protected in their camps against shelling or suicide-vehicle IEDs, which in Mali is unfortunately not always the case. However, I should add that we are working on improving that by, among other things, implementing new technology, an example of which is the indirect fire warning device. Soldiers also need access to proper accommodation, water, power sources and a basic level of welfare. I am aware that much of that is basically the responsibility of troop-contributing nations, one that I believe should be assessed and certified before the contingent is allowed to deploy. But to the extent that a unit does not bring those capacities into the Mission, I suppose it is only the United Nations that can help them.

Finally, I should mention that we need robust logistics. What do I mean by that? The proven United Nations system, whereby mission support delivers supplies using civilian contractors throughout the mission area, may work in certain well-established, low-threat missions. But it does not work in a hostile environment like that in Mali. To be very specific, north of the Niger River, the hostilities are so imminent and the road conditions are so poor that it is irresponsible to keep going there with old, fragile civilian trucks that are unprotected and driven by people who are not soldiers. That is one of the main reasons that we cannot sufficiently support our troops and our camps in the north. Therefore, we strongly need a military logistics unit to work in the most hostile parts of the country. It is not so important who commands the Mission support — whether it be the Force Commander — but the capacity is important. We also need the requisite aviation assets to help manage the burden of supplying distant bases, and we need contractors with the right equipment to be able to transport effectively along difficult supply routes, even in areas that are not highly contested.

Let me say a few words on training. It is of the utmost importance that United Nations forces be properly trained before deployment. Among the most important issues are patrolling, procedures and techniques, basic counter-IED capability, how to call for helicopters to evacuate casualties, the code of conduct and weapons training. There are other important skills as well, for instance, how to conduct crowd control. I say that because I have experienced that many of my troops are not good enough at those basic skills. I am sorry to say that I believe that we have suffered losses, because of insufficient predeployment training, that could have been avoided. The most important skill of all those mentioned is counter-IED training. Every single soldier needs to be able to search, detect and avoid IEDs and mines at a basic level. That training is quite simple to obtain. It does not require a very demanding training programme, and it will save lives. If we can manage to improve the predeployment training level, therefore, I will promise to maintain the skills of the troops once they have arrived in the Mission. If I did possess the envisaged mentor teams, the overall effectiveness of the Force would be enhanced.

To conclude, drawing on my personal experience from MINUSMA for a general recommendation, I am not in doubt that in future there will certainly be a continuous need for peacekeeping operations in asymmetric environments. I do not doubt that the United Nations will be called upon to establish those kinds of missions, because who else would? But if we want to be able to do it — and do it effectively — we need to be fully capable of facing that environment in all aspects. That means having the capability to face hostile armed groups hiding among the population and to face challenging climates, geography and infrastructure. To do that, we need to be properly trained. We need to be properly equipped with protected vehicles, to put a big effort into counter-IED and robust logistics, to protect the camps, to have proper intelligence, and we need to ensure that all staff posts are manned and manned with skilled officers. I know that sounds like a lot, but it is what we need if we want to be able to survive in an

asymmetric environment. I know well that to achieve it, we are demanding a lot from ourselves internally in the United Nations, for instance, from the Mission support, but also from the Member States paying the bill. I am also well aware that we are fully depending on troop-contributing nations providing the units that can do it.

Let me finish by assuring the Council that, under the circumstances, we are doing just OK in a way. While conducting operations, we work very hard in the Mission to improve capabilities and standards by stepping up our training efforts. New equipment is also coming in, and first and foremost, I am lucky that in general I have brave, robust, courageous soldiers who every day face the threat without shying away. But we need to prepare and support them better.

The President: I thank Major General Lollesgaard for his briefing.

I now give the floor to Major General Finn.

Major General Finn: It is an honour and a pleasure for me to be invited to speak today on the subject of caveats and impediments to command and performance. Since I was appointed Head of Mission and Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), almost two years ago, the subject and effects of caveats imposed by many of the 25 troop-contributing countries (TCCs) have never been far from my attention. The UNTSO military component is made up of approximately 153 unarmed military observers. My key tasks as the Head of Mission for UNTSO are to assign well-trained military observers under the operational control of the Force Commanders of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF). Focusing on supports to the Force Commander of UNDOF has been provided by Observer Group Golan, tasked within UNDOF to observe and report violations in the area of separation, located east of the disengagement line between Syria and the Israeli-occupied Golan, and the areas of limitation on both sides of the disengagement line, the Alpha side in the Israeli-occupied Golan and the Bravo side in the Syrian-controlled Golan.

Since the outset of the conflict in Syria, and especially as it spread to the Golan, we have all faced legitimate concerns regarding the safety and security of our personnel, including the UNTSO unarmed military observers of Observer Group Golan. Unfortunately, while UNDOF, UNTSO, the United Nations Department of Safety and Security and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations have sought to improve security measures and reduce risks, several of our troop-contributing countries imposed national caveats that restrict where their observers could deploy. Caveats are a controversial subject, and their impact on United Nations missions has been much discussed. Indeed, they impose significant restrictions on multinational operations and often restrict the operational role and functions of individual national contingents or United Nations military observers employed on multinational missions such as UNTSO.

Returning to the work of UNTSO, the deterioration of the situation in Syria has led to a number of countries, as stated, imposing restrictions on the activities of their personnel assigned to Observer Group Golan on the Syrian-controlled side of the ceasefire, which I referred to as the Bravo side. At one stage in 2013, all except seven of our 25 TCCs had caveats of varying effects on their observers deployed in Observer Group Golan. It even reached a situation where, if one more troop-contributing country had imposed restrictions, UNTSO would have been unable to meet its commitment to provide professional, trained military observers to the Force Commander of UNDOF on the Bravo side of the area of separation.

To give an idea of the effect of caveats, when the Force Commander of UNDOF and I briefed our TCCs in April 2014, I mentioned that only six nations provided over 75 per cent of the observers deployed on the Bravo side — that is, on the Syrian-controlled Golan. Naturally, the situation posed an undue burden on those nations, including in terms of exposure to risk. The restrictions also affected performance in that they complicated my efforts to maintain the desirable mix of three observers of different nationalities in any observation post in order to ensure better impartial reporting as well as an appropriate mix of experienced and inexperienced officers in teams and in our observation posts. It also limited the flexibility to assign officers of those nations to other locations where UNTSO operates — at our headquarters in Jerusalem, at our liaison offices in Beirut, Damascus, Jerusalem and Cairo, or to Observer Group Lebanon, the operation within UNIFIL in south Lebanon.

Caveats imposed distinctions among military observers and the roles they perform, affecting the morale of individual observers. As the Secretary-

General has reiterated in his reports on UNDOF, those restrictions have hindered the implementation of UNDOF's mandate, and they limited the capacities and hampered the operational flexibility of Observer Group Golan, on whose skills UNDOF relied move heavily when the deteriorating situation required increased focus on static observation and reduced mobile activities.

I fully understand what drove the imposition of those restrictions, and I share the desire of troop-contributing countries to see the risks to their deployed personnel mitigated to the greatest extent possible. In peacekeeping missions, removing the threats of course rests ultimately with the parties to the conflict and with those with influence over them. But I worked closely with the Force Commander of UNDOF to carry out a range of mitigating measures, including improved medical evacuation and casualty evacuation capacities. We raised and reinforced perimeter fences and equipped observers with advanced night vision equipment with remote viewing to allow them to anticipate threats. Work continued right up until our eventual relocation from the area of separation by UNDOF in September 2014. We fitted our observation posts with ballistic skirts and bulletproof glass on the observation towers.

We reassured TCCs by emphasizing the tight coordination between the Force Commander of UNDOF and myself and by the provision of contingency planning that was, and still is, manifested by regular evacuation exercises and the deployment of security parties for the observation posts to either augment or replace unarmed observers, if required. That close coordination, reflecting the priority placed by the UNDOF Force Commander and myself on safety and security, was demonstrated as recently as last month, when heavy firing over the course of a week impacted one of our observation posts.

Under-Secretary-General Ladsous has continuously stressed the importance that his Department and all peacekeeping operations place on the safety and security of personnel in the field. He has emphasized that contributors' personnel are our most critical asset. Since September of last year, all UNTSO observers, as well as the majority of UNDOF personnel, have been relocated to the Israeli-occupied side of the ceasefire line, due to the security situation, as a further mitigation measure implemented by my colleague the Force Commander of UNDOF in conjunction with DPKO.

Yet seven countries — not counting the four permanent members of the Security Council — that contribute observers but whose military personnel are restricted by the Disengagement Agreement from serving on the Golan continue to impose caveats. While that has limited impact at the moment, the limitations on performance and flexibility will again come to the fore when a decision is eventually made to return to the Bravo side. When that might occur will be determined on the basis of very best assessments of the security conditions, which UNDOF, with our support and that of DPKO, is continually monitoring. Therefore, the removal of the remaining national caveats remains a priority issue.

A recent review of UNTSO led by DPKO highlighted the mitigation measures that have been implemented by UNDOF and UNTSO in respect to the operations and physical security of military observers in Observer Group Golan. The review recommended that UNTSO contributors with caveats should be strongly urged to lift them. It also recommended reducing the number of military personnel contributed to UNTSO by countries that continue to have restrictions on the deployment of their military personnel, increasing the contributions of those that do not have caveats and expanding the pool of UNTSO TCCs by inviting new contributors without caveats.

With the support of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, some of those recommendations have been adopted, including the deployment of United Nations military observers from new TCCs and reducing the numbers of United Nations military observers from countries with national caveats. In addition, senior staff appointments or positions in the mission are being filled only by countries without caveats.

Caveats impact all United Nations peacekeeping missions, not just UNTSO. They restrict a commander's ability to exercise command and control and are an impediment to performance. I fully recognize the national interests that drive caveats, but I also see that caveats threaten to drive a wedge between contributing nations, also threatening United Nations peacekeeping and observer capabilities. It is welcome that the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations has made important recommendations in that regard.

Despite those challenges, the presence of United Nations peacekeepers on the Golan has played a key role in helping to prevent the Syrian conflict from

becoming a Syrian-Israeli conflict. Our well-trained observers continue to provide impartial and expert reports. I encourage contributors to UNTSO to continue to provide officers with the right profile and experience to match the challenges ahead.

I am grateful to all our TCCs for the support they continue to give to the work of peacekeepers during these challenging times. In particular, I extend my thanks to those nations that enable the deployment of their officers to all areas of UNTSO's area of operations, without restrictions.

The President: I thank Major-General Finn for his briefing.

I shall now give the floor to the members of the Security Council.

Mr. Mangaral (Chad) (*spoke in French*): I thank the Malaysian presidency of the Security Council for convening this annual public debate on peacekeeping operations. I would also like to thank Mr. Hervé Ladsous, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, the Force Commanders of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), and the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) for their briefings. Finally, I welcome the presence of the other Force Commanders, including the Commander of the African Union peacekeeping force in Somalia, who join us today.

Chad would like to pay homage to the 123,560 members of the 16 United Nations peacekeeping operations currently under way around the world. Peacekeeping soldiers spare no effort to fulfil their mandates, despite inadequate resources and the difficulties of all kinds that they face, including the security environment that confronts them. I would like to make several additional observations.

With respect to the protection of civilians, Chad rejects the abusive use of the concept of using force against States without regard for their political and sovereign independence. A number of countries, particularly in Africa, continue to suffer from that situation.

We recognize that the presence of the United Nations in failed States or those that are about to become so, constitutes a guarantee of security for defenceless civilian populations that faces all manner of threats. Protection of civilians is an essential task that is part of the mandate of virtually all United Nations peacekeeping operations. That protection must also be a moral obligation. However, we must ensure that we have a common understanding of the concept at all levels, including strategic, operational and tactical ones. It is also important that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and regional organizations, especially the African Union, strive to elaborate and, if need be, reach agreement on the principles for the protection of civilians for their respective organizations.

Providing a peacekeeping operation with a mandate for the protection of civilians is insufficient unless that operation possesses the necessary human, logistical and material resources to discharge its mission. A number of operations are finding it very difficult to implement their mandates due to insufficient human, material and intelligence resources, as well as weak deployment in the main areas where tensions prevail. That is the case, for example, with UNMISS and with the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic, but it also applies to many others. In addition to providing a physical presence that enables them to protect thousands of civilians, as we have seen in South Sudan, the United Nations can and must do better by investing more in prevention and mobility. Nor should robust intervention to protect civilians be excluded. In that regard, we reiterate our support for the early warning and rapid intervention mechanism of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, whose effectiveness has been proved.

Today, the circumstances on the ground mean that we have to be proactive. We have to understand that when the United Nations is unable to carry on with the task expected of it, namely, to protect defenceless civilians, it will not avoid criticism, such as that levelled against it following the genocides in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Rwanda. In addition, peacekeeping operations — without undermining traditional principles such as the consent of the parties, impartiality and the non-use of force except in cases of legitimate self-defence or defence of the mandate — must undertake offensive operations when the situation so requires. That is important for disarming armed groups that are attacking and harassing civilians, as is unfortunately the case in a number of countries, including the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mali.

Furthermore, pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, peacekeeping operations are authorized to utilize force to protect both the assets and staff of the United Nations. Therefore, when required, they have to use such force to prevent attacks against their facilities, soldiers and supply lines.

With regard to sexual violence and abuses against women and children, we wish to underscore the importance of increasing the number of female staff in peacekeeping operations, including in positions of responsibility. We wish to welcome the appointment of a woman, Major-General Kristin Lund, as Force Commander of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, and we urge the Secretariat to appoint more women at similar levels of authority.

Concerning Mali and the asymmetric landscape in which the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) is operating, the list established and updated by the Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee in accordance with resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) indicates that there are 24 entities associated with Al-Qaida in Africa, including 7 that are active in Mali.

Given the realities on the ground, we wonder if MINUSMA is undertaking a fight against terrorism instead of peacekeeping. Moreover, MINUSMA's contingents do not have the training or the materiel, logistics or intelligence neceessary to tackle the current situation in northern Mali. It is urgent that States possessing the necessary capacities provide the resources just mentioned to troop- and police-contributing countries so that they will be capable of discharging their mandate. The credibility of the United Nations and the whole of the international community is at stake there.

The work carried out by the international forces and MINUSMA must be time-limited, because their mission is not to remain in Mali forever. Therefore, in keeping with the principle of national ownership, the focus should be on strengthening Mali's national defence and police forces, which bear the primary responsibility for the defence of the country. In addition, in terms of regional ownership, emphasis should be placed on the Nouakchott Process on the Enhancement of Security Cooperation and the Operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture in the Sahelo-Saharan Region. The will of African States, especially those of the group of five Sahel States — Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, the Niger and Chad — is not lacking. The assistance of partners such as the United Nations could be decisive.

Moreover, trouble-makers and those who attack the United Nations must answer for their actions. Therefore, the Malian authorities should spare no effort to undertake investigations to identify and bring to justice the perpetrators of attacks against MINUSMA, whether they be rebels or terrorists. We know it is very difficult to distinguish between a rebel and a terrorist in northern Mali. However, through intelligence work and strengthening of human intelligence-gathering within MINUSMA, we can assist Mali in achieving this and punish those who should be punished.

My country has paid a heavy price in Mali, but nothing can stem our resolve to continue to help this fraternal country. We are getting ready to deploy 335 additional soldiers and one constituted formed police unit there in the near future.

With regard to UNTSO, we welcome the work of the military observers and encourage them to continue to fulfil their mission of observation. We know that many troop-contributing countries are experiencing great difficulties when it comes to deploying their experts to certain areas because of security concerns. No doubt this has a considerable impact on the implementation of the mandate of the military observers. Peacekeeping is not a risk-free activity. Unfortunately, many countries contributing to peacekeeping are not ready to evolve and adapt to unforeseen and dangerous situations. We regret that attitude, which must change.

I would like to pay tribute to United Nations peacekeepers and to express my sympathy and condolences to the Governments and the families of those who have lost their lives during their mission.

I conclude by asking three questions directed at the Major-General Lollesgaard of MINUSMA. What do we need to do to improve the situation in northern Mali and to prevent asymmetric attacks against MINUSMA? Does he believe that the idea of a rapid intervention force by the Sahel States could be useful to MINUSMA? MINUSMA is the second-most-dangerous United Nations operation, after that deployed to Somalia during the 1990s. Given this, what does he intend to do and what does he expect of the United Nations to minimize the risks in terms of loss of human lives?

Mr. Gimolieca (Angola): We welcome the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Mr. Hervé Ladsous, Leiutenant-General Tesfamariam,

Force Commander of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, Major-General Michael Lollesgaard, Force Commander of the United National Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali and Major-General Michael Finn, Head of Mission and Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization. We thank them for their briefings. We express our deep appreciation for the very interesting and useful insights provided.

We acknowledge the dramatic change in the nature and scope of United Nations peace operations worldwide. With reference to the Secretary-General's remarks on 11 June 2014 (see S/PV.7196), at present United Nations peacekeeping missions are forced to operate in situations where there is no peace to keep. Thus the field personnel entrusted with the mandate to protect civilians are themselves increasingly under threat and forced to counter asymmetric and unconventional attacks while carrying out other complex mandated tasks, including protecting the civilian population.

The three topics introduced by the briefers reflect the complex reality of the environment in which peace operations are deployed. I shall briefly address each of them, namely, the challenges involved in the protection of civilians, the challenge of operating in an asymmetric environment, and the challenges arising from caveats and impediments in the command and performance of peace operations.

The protection of civilians has become the central feature of the mandates approved by the Security Council, and the primary reason to deploy a United Nations peacekeeping mission. However, at present this core objective of United Nations missions is seriously challenged by repeated cycles of violence, weak governance and reoccurring instability, even in countries where peace agreements have been successfully implemented.

From the United Nations perspective, interpreting the concept of the protection of civilians consists of a three-tiered approach as part of a mission's strategy — with dialogue and engagement as the first tier, the provision of physical protection as the second and the establishment of a protective environment as the third. Those concepts are key elements in ensuring a mission's success. However, the lack of resources and effective information gathering and analysis undermine the efforts of States working towards unity of purpose with the different troop-contributing countries within a mission. Law and order problems and inadequate training and preparation of military forces are also challenges that the Council must address in a timely manner. Corrective measures are necessary to avoid failure and ensure the best conditions for a mission's success.

Operating under an asymmetric environment is the most extreme situation facing contemporary peacekeeping missions, which were originally designed as a separation force to maintain trust or an armistice agreement between symmetric opposing regular armed forces. At present, as the assessment review shows, an asymmetric environment in which a peacekeeping mission operates poses major security and safety issues to peacekeepers, who are mandated, as their core objective, to protect civilians. That is further compounded by the increasing threat of regional terrorism, particularly in Africa, with the use of vehicle-based bombs and improvised explosive devices and suicide attacks increasing the numbers of casualties among United Nations personnel. It is therefore necessary to establish a comprehensive asymmetrical threat approach as part of a strategic framework aimed at this deadly threat, while maintaining the military and civilian components, thereby permitting the mission to effectively accomplish its mandate.

Finally, the conditionality imposed by caveats acts as an impediment to command and performance, given that unity of command and control is of paramount importance in any mission's performance and success. Also, some Member States contributing troops or police to peacekeeping missions impose caveats, such as with regard to the location of deployment, the types of actions that units are not allowed to undertake and parallel rules of engagement. These, against the backdrop of an operational link between a contingent and their capitals, often result in the disobedience of orders on the part of the Force Commander. That is a totally unacceptable situation, as it hampers the mission's operational capabilities. We are of the view that troop- and police-contributing countries should strictly respect the chain of command, since the failure to follow coherent and consistent orders of the Force Commander may lead to wrongdoing and even catastrophic consequences to all those involved, while damaging the reputation of the entire United Nations system.

In conclusion, we express our deep appreciation for the convening of this meeting, for the briefings provided and for the interaction afforded between

Council members and the Force Commanders as heads of the military components on the ground.

Mr. Barros Melet (Chile) (*spoke in Spanish*): We thank the presidency for convening this informative meeting. We also welcome the briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations and the Force Commanders of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), as well as the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, as part of a joint effort towards achieving peace and security.

I will begin by recalling my country's commitment to peacekeeping operations since 1948 and by reiterating our willingness to continue cooperating on this task, which is the responsibility of all.

The three issues under discussion are absolutely relevant and interrelated and reflect the new situations and challenges and the changing reality involving today's peacekeeping efforts. Regrettably, the civilian population remains the most affected by conflicts, most of which are intra-State in nature. The Council and the international community as a whole are therefore called upon to provide adequate protection for the civilian population and to adopt comprehensive strategies, taking into accoutn the specific needs, especially of women and children.

We reiterate the need for adequate protection-of-civilians training for the military, police or civilians to be deployed. Chile has been contributing for more than a decade through the Chilean Joint Peacekeeping Operations Centre, which is in charge of preparing and training national or foreign personnel prior to deployment.

The Rights up Front Action Plan reaffirms the central role of human rights in the work of the United Nations. Respect for human rights and international humanitarian law are ultimately the key concepts underlying the protection of civilians.

Missions play a role as a source of information and in keeping records to ensure that those responsible for violations of international humanitarian and human rights law are held accountable for their actions and do not go unpunished. We support the zero tolerance policy concerning missions. At the same time, we must ensure sufficient dissemination of the protection-of-civilians policy and existing complaints mechanisms to the civilian population and within the missions.

With regard to the situation in UNMISS, recent reports indicate an increase in internally displaced persons and increasingly complex conditions requiring the protection of civilians, including sexual violence perpetrated with impunity, used as a tactic of war. Recognizing the efforts undertaken by the Mission, we would like to ask about the greatest challenges faced by UNMISS in carrying out its mandate, specifically regarding the protection of civilians? Do the briefers believe that the troops have been sufficiently trained, as of today, to carry out the protection of civilians mandate?

The efforts already mentioned are taking place in a difficult environment where, above and beyond the nature of the conflict, actions by terrorist groups or transnational organized criminal networks are taking place. Those new challenges require better-trained and -equipped troops and strengthened national capacities.

The use of intelligence, particularly as a prevention tool, seems appropriate to address such asymmetric threats. The experience in Mali bears that out and reveals the need to predict conflict scenarios. However, it is vital that this activity be provided with a clear regulatory framework. We understand that the discussion should take place among the membership of the United Nations, particularly the troop- and police-contributing countries within the framework of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. In that regard, we would like to know about MINUSMA's experience in managing information and if it led to increased security on behalf of the troops and civilians.

We recognize the importance of the troops deployed on the ground responding to a chain of command to ensure the success of the assigned tasks. However, that does not prevent the troop-contributing countries from determining the conditions and locations under which their forces will be deployed at the time of the signing of the respective memorandums of understanding and according to their capacities and means in relation to particular situations. The early conclusion of such memorandums allows the Department of Operations Peacekeeping to know in advance the elements and units available to meet the different scenarios.

Mr. Wang Min (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): I wish to thank the three peacekeeping operations Force Commanders for their briefings. Their first-hand accounts and suggestions are useful and can help us to get a better idea of the actual deployment of peacekeeping operations and the difficulties peacekeepers face, all

of which is in the interest of improving the efficiency of the Security Council's work. China wishes to pay its highest tribute to all the Force Commanders present and all the United Nations peacekeeping personnel on duty for their professionalism, which is characterized by dedication, devotion and willingness to sacrifice.

The current international situation has undergone profound changes. There are threats from terrorist organizations, situations where there is no peace to keep, and changes in terms of the growing size of peacekeeping operations. These new developments demand that peacekeeping operations adapt to the changing times and embrace innovation.

China supports the initiative of the Secretary-General to conduct a review of peacekeeping operations during the seventieth anniversary of the United Nations. We welcome the report submitted by the High-level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. We expect to further refine mandates, strengthen capabilities and improve the efficiency of United Nations peacekeeping operations through this review, so as to bring peace and hope to host countries and peoples and realize the goal of maintaining international peace and security.

Taking into account the views expressed by the three Commanders, I wish to make the following four points on peacekeeping operations.

First, the basic principles of peacekeeping operations should be upheld unswervingly. The success of the United Nations arises from compliance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and peacekeeping operations are no different. Continued adherence to the basic principles of peacekeeping operations — the consent of the parties to the conflcit, impartiality and non-use of force except in self-defence and defence fo the mandate — is fundamental to guaranteeting their smooth conduct, ensuring their fairness and impartiality and winning the support of Member States. We must persist in applying those principles. At the same time, we must refine the rules of engagement and guidelines for troop-contributing countries in the light of changes in the peacekeeping environment and mission mandates, so as to better implement the principles of peacekeeping operations.

Secondly, the mandates of peacekeeping operations should be practical and feasible. In order to solve regional hot-spot issues, we need to have a comprehensive policy. Peacekeeping operations cannot, and should not, attempt to resolve every problem. In deploying peacekeeping operations and in formulating and reviewing peacekeeping mandates, the Council should enhance its political guidance, ensure that the mandates correspond to the actual needs of host countries and clarify priority priorities, targets and specific focuses for various stages. At the same time, we should review the results of the implementation of peacekeeping operations in a phased manner, and, in keeping with the changing environment, we should make adjustments to the mandates of the missions and the deployment of forces. Peacekeeping operations should, in accordance with the changing environment and the will and consent of host countries, determine timely exit strategies.

Thirdly, peacekeeping operations should respect the sovereignty of the host countries. With regard to protecting civilians, host countries have the primary responsibility for protecting their own civilians. Peacekeeping operations should conform to Council mandates and international law and should assist host countries in implementing the responsibilities for protecting civilians. The scope and conditions of the protection-of-civilians mandate should be clearly defined and should be recognized and supported by host countries and the international community in order to prevent misunderstandings and animosity from the local people. Peacekeeping operations should also be equipped with the necessary resources in terms of personnel, equipment and logistics.

Fourthly, peacekeeping operations should strengthen their capacity-building and scientific management. China attaches great importance to the challenges facing peacekeeping operations in an asymmetrical security environment. We hope that the Secretariat and peacekeeping missions will collaborate closely with troop-contributing countries and host countries to come up with tailor-made standards governing the safety of installations, in keeping with the changing security situation in mission areas, and with detailed rules for the organization, training and management of United Nations peacekeeping personnel.

At the same time, there is a need to strengthen the scientific planning and management of peacekeeping missions in order to optimize our financial resources. We should utilize the existing resources more efficiently and avoid unnecessary duplication and waste.

China firmly supports and actively takes part in United Nations peacekeeping operations. At present there are more than 3,000 Chinese peacekeepers on duty in about 10 peacekeeping operations in countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali and South Sudan. The Chinese infantry unit assigned to the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan is fully deployed. This is the first time that China has sent an infantry unit to United Nations peacekeeping operations. China has also decided to send a helicopter squadron to the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur. This will be the first time that the Chinese Air Force will join the Blue Helmets. China is willing to send more peacekeeping police and police affairs experts to be part of United Nations peacekeeping operations.

We will continue to support African countries in strengthening their capacity-building and to promote the United Nations support of the African Union, as well as other regional organizations, in conducting peacekeeping operations. We are ready to work with the international community to contribute positively to the healthy development of United Nations peacekeeping operations and to make new and positive contributions to the noble cause of maintaining international peace and security.

Ms. Power (United States of America): I thank all of the Force Commanders for their briefings and for their service. I also thank Under-Secretary-General Ladsous for assembling the Force Commanders here. This is a critical annual gathering and an important rite of passage.

As we mark the seventieth anniversary of the United Nations, the founders of the Organization would never have conceived of the assortment of 16 Force Commanders gathered here today, nor the operating environments into which they deploy. The risk that they and the men and women under their command take are a powerful testament to the spirit that animates the United Nations. Their work, their leadership and their sacrifice could not be more important.

I wish also to take this occasion to extend my country's deep appreciation to all countries on the Council and beyond in the United Nations that deploy troops and police to United Nations missions in very difficult environments. Peacekeepers deserve the support and attention of the Security Council, and we in turn rely on the candour and expertise of Commanders to help us to better address the challenges facing peacekeeping.

Before asking several questions, I will focus on three essential aspects of what the Force Commanders have just touched upon, specifically the imperative of appropriate training, the importance of expanding the pool of troop-contributing countries (TCCs) and the kinds of contributions they make, and the critical question of how the system handles exceptions to the rules of engagement.

First, as has been said, we must prepare peacekeepers for the missions in which they serve, as they are increasingly dangerous missions. As many here know, the United States recently conducted a study in Mali through the United States Army's Asymmetric Warfare Group. I am sure that it will come as no surprise to experienced Force Commanders, but the findings made it abundantly clear that tailored pre-deployment training for peacekeepers headed to Mali is the most important and the largest gap in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), and that, of course, was underscored here today by the MINUSMA Force Commander.

We must do everything possible to avoid sending men and women unprepared into environments where violent extremists operate. We owe it to our peacekeepers and the people they protect to do better, and we extend special condolences to Chad, which has lost more soldiers in MINUSMA, I believe, than any other contingent.

While the Asymmetric Warfare Group's findings were specific to Mali, this need for contextualized training, including scenario-based protection-of-civilians training, goes far beyond any one mission. No one size fits all, needless to say. The context of protecting internally displaced persons during the rainy season in South Sudan while cohabitating with them in United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) sites is very different from protecting civilians against rebels who wear army uniforms and melt into the jungle in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, or, for that matter, against banditry and militias in the Central African Republic. These are very, very different and specific contexts and specific threat environments.

This leads me to my second point, on expanding the scope of troop-contributing countries and the kinds of contributions they make. We all agree that we need to continue to broaden and deepen the pool of

troop-contributing countries and increase contingents with niche capabilities to operate in challenging environments. Some of those niche capabilities have been discussed today.

To assist in this endeavour, the Secretariat has published a paper detailing the capabilities required for current United Nations peacekeeping operations. President Obama will host a peacekeeping summit during the General Assembly high-level week with the goal of working with the Secretary-General and other troop-contributing countries and financial supporters of peacekeeping to ensure that the United Nations can draw on the resources of contributing nations to fulfil the essential role played by United Nations peacekeeping, to make it more responsive, more effective and safer for civilians as well as for the peacekeepers who compose such missions.

But increased and smarter contributions will not be enough to help modern peacekeeping operations meet the challenges they face. Responsive planning and support to missions must also improve. The legacy structure of sustainment planning and logistics support is currently not adequate to back peacekeepers who face these modern threats. When a peacekeeper in a mission is wounded, be it in Mali, Darfur or elsewhere, it is unconscionable that he or she cannot receive immediate medical care, including evacuation.

Thirdly, I should like to turn quickly to caveats. Force Commanders need to have confidence that contingents will follow their leadership. A recent study from the global peace operations initiative on operational partnerships in United Nations peacekeeping found that restrictive national caveats placed undue burdens on those TCCs that have not put such restrictions in place and that have to pick up the slack. We heard about that here with the specifics of the Golan in mind.

Secret caveats, which are declared only when a crisis breaks out, pose a particular risk to all mission personnel, including the peacekeepers themselves who have the caveats. In emergencies, commanders need to know that orders will be carried out fully and without pushback. But even open caveats, which are made known to mission leadership from the start, are deeply concerning when they restrict the ability of contingents to undertake mission-critical tasks.

Decisions on how peacekeepers respond to a threat or how to engage to protect civilians should be left to the Force Commander and mission leadership and carried out through the mission's chain of command, with full respect for the mission's mandate. Those unwilling to abide by the Force Commander's directives or to fulfil the mandate should not deploy.

Finally, I would be remiss if I did not address the recent terrible allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse being committed at the hands of international forces, including some United Nations peacekeepers. While the vast majority of peacekeepers serve honourably, and make, again, tremendous sacrifices, I must say unequivocally that this alleged conduct is unacceptable and that any personnel who commit such acts must be brought to justice by their national authorities. There is no room in United Nations peacekeeping or in any regional or national mission for those who would prey on the most vulnerable, whom they are there to protect. This should be a principle that all of us can rally around at the United Nations.

Before I give up the floor, I just have a few questions for our briefers.

First, it would be helpful to hear from General Yohannes, as we have about MINUSMA, what the biggest training gaps are among troops who arrive as part of UNMISS and within the Mission headquarters staff. What are the gaps that he would like to see filled? We would welcome any insight he has as to how we, as the Council, might help address these gaps.

I should like also to know what General Finn's standard operating procedure is when a contingent comes to him and informs him that it has certain caveats on his operation. We heard his concerns about caveats, but when he receives that information, does he discuss this, then, with the contingent Commander? Does he inform Department of Peacekeeping Operations headquarters? Is this reported to the Security Council in any manner? It is not, to my knowledge, but it may be that information is circulated that we are not aware of. Could we think constructively and productively about procedural changes that might help us mobilize the will to overcome this challenge, which he eloquently described?

I would also ask Under-Secretary-General Ladsous what is needed from Member States, what is needed within the Secretariat, what is needed in the missions to improve support to peacekeepers with regard to medical evacuations? This is an issue that, of course, every troop-contributing country and police-contributing

country probably would like to have more assurance on before they deploy into harm's way.

I would ask the same question of the Force Commanders, as they are dealing with the mechanics of medical evacuation in the field. Concretely, are there things that they are missing or steps that they think we could be taking to ensure this most basic care for the troops and police under their command?

Mr. Bosah (Nigeria): I thank you, Mr. President, for having organized this very important briefing. I welcome the briefers, Lieutenant General Tesfamariam, Major General Lollesgaard and Major General Michael Finn. The clarity and incisiveness of their perspectives on the issues under consideration bear out the wisdom and importance of this interaction, which is aimed at fostering greater synergy between the field and the Security Council. Let me commend them in particular for their immeasurable sacrifices in leading their various peace missions.

It is of global concern that civilians are often deliberately targeted in armed conflicts and frequently subjected to blatant violations of their rights under international law. The Council has since 1999 responded to this challenge by prioritizing the protection of civilians in theatres of conflict. In furtherance of this quest, Security Council resolution 1894 (2009) called for dedicated resources for the protection of civilians in armed conflict. That underlines the compelling necessity to protect the rights of civilians in theatres of conflict and highlights the urgency of continued efforts to improve strategies to address this arduous task. We believe that enhanced cooperation among the United Nations, troop-contributing countries, police-contributing countries and the hosts in the beneficiary States, particularly in areas of mandate formulation and implementation, could achieve this objective.

In a briefing by the Head of Mission of the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan, Ellen Margrethe Løj, to the Council last month (see S/PV.7444), the widespread human rights abuses and killing of civilians in Unity state of South Sudan was highlighted. It necessitated the evacuation of humanitarian workers, thereby aggravating the suffering of civilians in the state. We note the challenges sustained in these camps and would appreciate the comments of Lieutenant General Tesfamariam on measures being taken to ensure their long-term viability.

As we reflect on modalities for sustained protection-of-civilian sites under such challenging circumstances, we want to reiterate that clarity of mandates on the protection of civilians, and accord among peacekeeping contingents on implementation strategies, are both essential to safeguarding civilians in conflict areas. As peacekeepers strive to implement such mandates, they must at all times endeavour to remain transparent in their actions, as incidents of misconduct — particularly those that border on violence and sexual exploitation of women and children — are inexcusable. Nigeria condemns such acts whenever and wherever they occur. We believe that a speedy and impartial investigation into allegations of such heinous acts and imposition of appropriate sanctions on errant personnel will serve to establish accountability as a hallmark of peacekeeping operations.

The increasing asymmetric attacks on peacekeepers in conflict areas have generated much concern. The casualty rates, especially those in the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, have taken on unacceptable proportions. We propose that the international community increase its assistance to peacekeeping missions and other regional arrangements involving anti-terrorism operations. That could be achieved through the provision of much-needed equipment designed to mitigate the devastating effect of improvised explosive devices.

Also of great concern is the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, especially among non-State actors. That exacerbates conflicts and threatens the well-being of civilians in conflict situations. It also poses challenges to the effective implementation of peacekeeping mandates, especially when non-State actors carry out asymmetric attacks against peacekeepers. That is why denying non-State actors sanctuary and forces is of the utmost importance.

We are witness to the evolving nature of conflicts in a contemporary world. This underscores the imperative for the Council to demonstrate greater flexibility in adjustment of peacekeeping mandates without necessarily waiting for their expiration. Such flexibility will enable prompt and appropriate responses to threats on the ground.

I would like to conclude by affirming our commitment to collective security as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, while paying tribute to those who have paid the ultimate price in the line of

duty so that others might live in peace. Let us take this opportunity to renew our resolve as peacekeepers to respecting and preserving the fundamentals of United Nations peacekeeping.

Mr. Iliichev (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): We thank the Malaysian delegation of for organizing today's meeting. We are also grateful to the Force Commanders of the military components of the missions in South Sudan, Mali and the Middle East for their very comprehensive briefings. We believe that this type of meeting format — by now traditional in nature — is most useful. It allows us to better grasp problems facing United Nations contingents on the ground and to understand operational issues concerning the activities of missions. This dialogue is especially important in its consideration of the new challenges and threats facing today's United Nations peacekeeping operations, whose mandates are increasingly complex and comprehensive.

One of the most dangerous trends is the growth of non-traditional, non-State actors jeopardizing the safety of peacekeepers. That places additional responsibilities on the Security Council, which formulates the mandates of peacekeeping operations. Currently, the majority of peacekeeping operations are tasked with the protection of civilians in situations of armed conflict. We are convinced that the effectiveness of their implementation is based on unswerving compliance with the provisions of international humanitarian law and the Security Council's mandates, which, in turn, must be clear and not subject to multiple interpretations.

The deployment of United Nations peacekeeping operations is a harbinger of hope for States in situations of conflict. The population expects support to be provided from the Organization, as well as measures to suppress violence. That is why inaction on the part of missions — just like the excessive use of force that goes beyond the parameters set by the provisions of the mandates — has a negative impact on the standing of the United Nations and undermines the local population's trust in the United Nations presence. In that context, the imperative is to forge constructive daily cooperation between peacekeepers and local authorities and to promote capacity-building by host States, which bear direct responsibility for the protection of their own population. That applies, first and foremost, to missions where the protection of civilians is a primary objective. For example, the Security Council initially entrusted the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) with a fairly strong mandate to protect the civilian population. Unfortunately, however, as a result of various factors, including systemic shortcomings in terms of political and military analysis and forecasting and operational planning in South Sudan, the Mission was not always ready to tackle the tasks that had been set. We expect that a careful analysis of the experience of the leaders of UNMISS, the provision of regular information to the Security Council about the situation on the ground, as well as the allocation of substantial additional resources to the Misison will have a positive bearing on its effectiveness.

Of significant concern are the asymmetric threats that have arisen in areas where United Nations peacekeeping operations are deployed. Among these were a string of violent acts targeting the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) peacekeepers, which led to numerous casualties. In that regard, we note some work on past mistakes made by the leadership of the Mission. It has become clear that the effective implementation of sanctions within the framework of Security Council-granted broad mandates is feasible only if peacekeepers are perfectly prepared and specially trained and psychologically hardened, as well as supplied with the appropriate modern equipment and transport assets. Contingency deployment locations must be fortified in military and engineering terms. Proper coordination and exchange of operational data are also essential. That process should involve host States and their security forces, with strict respect for their sovereignty and that of neighbouring and other interested States and, if present, that of other foreign military presences on the ground.

We think that the implementation of the aforementioned tasks is impossible without appropriate and clear command structures. However, the concept of military responsibility is not limited to giving orders, but also includes responsibility for the safety and security one's subordinates. That is why a careful analysis of emerging threats to United Nations personnel must be an indispensable component in the planning of operations. Achieving objectives should not take place to the detriment of United Nations Blue Helmets. The timeliness of the issues being discussed is borne out by the fact that they were also clearly reflected in yesterday's presentation to the Secretary-General by the experts of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations of their report and recommendations, which need to be carefully analysed and discussed.

Mr. González de Linares Palou (Spain) (*spoke in Spanish*): Spain would like to thank you, Mr. President, for having organized this meeting, which we frankly find very useful. We would also like to thank Under-Secretary-General Ladsous and the three Force Commanders — of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) — for their briefings.

Spain would like to take this opportunity once again to reiterate its appreciation of the work done by the peacekeeping missions. We also thank the contingents and the troop-contributing countries for their generosity and commitment to maintaining international peace and security. This year is particularly important because of the review of peacekeeping operations that is being conducted, to which Spain has contributed with a view to strengthening the missions and improving their effectiveness and security. I should like to make three general comments.

First, we must work together to prevent a gulf from opening between the mandates and their implementation on the ground. To that end, we must not only be extremely careful in defining the mandates but also try and improve the effectiveness with which they are implemented, since the failure of such implementation fosters doubts and affects the credibility of the missions themselves.

Secondly, mandates must always go hand in hand with the necessary capabilities. Contingents must receive adequate, specific training, equipment and resources to increase their reaction capability, their mobility and the use of new technologies.

Thirdly, for Spain, the work being done by peacekeeping operations to protect civilians is essential, although we must not forget that such protection is principally the responsibility of the States. MINUSMA is operating in extremely difficult conditions paradigmatic of the new volatile environments in which missions are operating today. I can assure Major General Lollesgaard that MINUSMA is the subject of the Security Council's constant concern and attention. One of his predecessors, Major General Kazura, stated that MINUSMA was operating

> "in a terrorist-fighting situation without an anti-terrorist mandate or adequate training, equipment, logistics or intelligence to deal with such a situation" (*S/PV.7275, p. 33*).

Subsequently, in November 2014, the Security Council held an interactive dialogue to address the appropriateness of the mandate of MINUSMA in view of the asymmetric attacks on the Mission. The concept of operations, which dated from 2013, was revised to take into account the new political and security climate, and a series of measures was taken to purge elements that we might describe as irregular.

Fourthly, the Secretary-General's latest report (S/2015/426) includes proposals to improve the flexibility, reaction capability and effectiveness of the Mission in an environment that is, let us remember, asymmetric. In other words, far from being inactive, the Security Council has been very attentive to developments on the ground. Unfortunately, however, the number of casualties and victims among the Blue Helmets of MINUSMA remains very high and the difficulties faced by the Mission in carrying out its mandate are enormous. Spain wishes to condemn the intentional attacks on the Mission's staff, a situation that we consider absolutely unacceptable. We must explore accountability mechanisms and the Government of Mali must cooperate with us on this matter. As we all know, the main challenge remains the discrepancy between the diagnosis of the situation, which is that of a political crisis, and the reality of an asymmetric environment characterized by jihadi terrorism, organized crime networks and, above all, the overwhelming isolation of MINUSMA in the north of the country.

We need to find a balance between the security of the contingents and the fulfilment of the mandates, but all involved are obliged to ensure that the staff can carry out their functions with security standards that are appropriate given the threats and circumstances and allow them to implement their mandate. The introduction of new technologies is essential for the effective performance of these tasks and the security of the contingents themselves.

With regard to UNMISS, we wish to reiterate our support for a Mission that has also been operating in a very complex environment since last year. The work done to provide shelter for 118,000 refugees and internally displaced persons is extraordinary and has defined the Mission's day-to-day situation. Although each United Nations operation is a separate world, as Mr. Ladsous pointed out in his briefing, we must recognize that the

shift from essentially a peace consolidation operation to one focused on protecting civilians represents a radical change that poses tremendous challenges. In our opinion, the joint efforts of the Secretary-General's Special Representative for South Sudan, the Force Commander and the troop-contributing countries must be evaluated to make the Mission more proactive and robust. At the same time, we must seek to improve the Mission's effectiveness in the implementation of its mandate, including the projection of its presence outside the refugee camps.

Let us remember that UNMISS is an integrated Mission and that coordination and coherence among all of its components is therefore supposed to exist. Without such coordination and coherence, the Mission will fail. It is very important that the United Nations continue monitoring and observing the human rights situation in South Sudan. I would recall that, when the mandate of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo was renewed, the Security Council took an important step forward by requesting the Secretary-General to provide updates on the ways in which the Mission was fulfilling its mandate to protect civilians and on the measures it was taking to transform itself and perform its mandates more efficiently and effectively. At the proposal of Spain, such a requirement was also introduced for UNMISS because we consider it a good practice that should be followed in all the other missions.

With regard to UNTSO and the question of caveats, we believe that the troop-contributing countries can legitimately impose caveats on the deployment of their troops under certain conditions, provided that such caveats are expressed in the appropriate way and with the appropriate respect for the chain of command. It is precisely when a peacekeeping operation is obliged to operate in a crisis situation — in a hostile environment — that the maintenance of the chain of command acquires critical importance and must be respected without interference from the national authorities involved.

Even when caveats are worded in compliance with the established procedures, however, they can of course complicate the fulfilment of mandates, particularly when an operation is forced to deploy in hostile conditions, for example when the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) was obliged to withdraw to the Alpha line in September 2014. Fortunately, Observer Group Golan, which consists of UNTSO observers, was able to maintain a number of positions on the Bravo line in the Mount Hermon area, where, unless military observers carry on working, it would be very difficult for UNDOF to continue to implement its mandate. At their new positions on the Alpha line, the UNTSO observers continued their work in very difficult conditions, illustrated by various incidents in late April and early May that resulted in four of the contingent being injured and the evacuation of observation post 51. I would like to thank Major General Finn and all the UNTSO observers deployed with UNDOF for the admirable work they continue to do in very difficult conditions. Today the ability to patrol with guarantees or deploying to agreed observation points continues to be far from reality. That is producing violations of the terms of resolution 350 (1974) for both sides. Armed groups, including the Al-Nusra Front, which is on the list of terrorist groups, are present in the area. That may be the greatest violation of the separation agreements, but it is not the only one.

I would like to ask Major General Finn, can the UNTSO observers carry out their tasks in their present positions while complying with the minimum levels of operability?

Mr. Van Bohemen (New Zealand): I would like to thank Under-Secretary-General Ladsous and the Force Commanders, whom we commend for the frankness of their assessments, as befits the seasoned professional leaders they clearly are.

I would also like to acknowledge and pay tribute to all who serve the United Nations, especially those in high-risk environments. Today we have again been reminded that some United Nations soldiers make the ultimate sacrifice, giving their lives in the performance of their duty. This phenomenon of dead United Nations soldiers is extraordinarily confronting. Whatever the reality of the new threat environment, it should not be happening. United Nations peacekeepers should not even be targets, let alone casualties. The fact that it is happening is at the core of the three briefings we have had today. It is also at the core of why some countries find it so difficult to contribute troops to United Nations operations.

Yesterday, the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations told us that all peacekeepers — civilian, military and police — must do all they can to ensure that civilians are not harmed. That is clearly right, yet as we have been reminded today by General Tesfamariam, living up to that principle, which flows so easily off the

tongue, is extraordinarily difficult. The challenge for the United Nations Mission in South Sudan is indeed extraordinary — a complete breakdown of civilian Government, with our poor soldiers left to protect the civilians whose Government and leaders have abandoned them. It is unacceptable that the force is having to contend with direct harassment and repeated violations of the status-of-forces agreement. We believe that the Security Council must keep a very close eye on South Sudan and the situation there.

I would also like to congratulate Major General Lollesgaard on the frankness of his assessment. He has told us bluntly that the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali is not properly equipped to operate in the asymmetric threat environment prevailing in northern Mali. That is something that the Organization must listen and respond to. We wholeheartedly support his plea that troops who are sent to Mali are indeed trained and equipped to deal with the situation in which they must operate. We welcome the progress the General was able to point to, particularly in the development of an intelligence capability. We acknowledge the importance of intelligence for enhancing situational awareness, in assisting force protection and supporting the protection of civilians. I would like to ask him whether he sees a role for an all-sources information forces unit capability in the Mission to assist in the conduct of an information operations campaign.

I would also like to ask him a question that continues to challenge me when I think about the operations that the United Nations must now work in. Can a force that is equipped with the armour and other equipment needed to operate safely in a serious threat environment at the same time make the connections to the local population that are necessary to engender the trust that we know is essential to the fulfilment of their mission?

I would like to commend Major General Finn for laying out so clearly the challenge he has had to confront in dealing with the caveats imposed by various troop contributors to the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). In a similar spirit of candour, I want to acknowledge that the reason for some of those caveats is related to a concern that the United Nations operation was not sufficiently equipped, directed and supported to ensure the protection of the soldiers operating there. We do not like caveats, and we certainly agree with the Ambassador of the United States that if caveats are imposed, they should be imposed openly and must not come as a surprise to the Force Commander. New Zealand has withdrawn the caveats it had in place on military observers serving in UNTSO, based on improved medical support, the rehearsal of casualty evacuation plans and the inclusion in the mission of a team to counter improvised explosive devices. But the issue is a serious one, and we believe there must be an open and honest conversation between the troop contributors, the Secretariat and the Council about the caveats and the reasons for them, and how we might find a way of minimizing and preferably doing away with them entirely.

Mr. Rycroft (United Kingdom): I welcome this opportunity for a candid and constructive discussion with the Force Commanders. I wish to thank Mr. Ladsous and the three Generals for their briefings. I look forward to their responses to our questions.

I would first like to take this opportunity to pay tribute to all the Force Commanders for their service and leadership, and to the men and women who serve in and support the United Nations peace operations. They are all at the sharpest edge of the Security Council's efforts to preserve international peace and security, putting their lives on the line in the most challenging environments. And sadly, as we have seen in places such as Mali and South Sudan, that dedication comes at a tragic cost.

The Commanders' insights into the reality on the ground and the constraints they face are invaluable to the Council's decision-making on their mandates and, ultimately, to the promotion of international peace and security, and I would therefore encourage them to always be open and frank so that we can provide them with the best possible support.

That need for ever-greater transparency and accountability was also a prominent feature of yesterday's peace operations review panel and, as was said then in relation to allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse, zero tolerance must mean zero tolerance. All troop-contributing countries must robustly follow up any such allegations involving their troops and report back to the United Nations. More broadly, we favour honest and open communications, including through meetings such as this one, to create ever-greater openness about peacekeeping more broadly.

The protection of civilians is an issue that the United Kingdom cares deeply about. In the darkest moments of conflict, people all over the world look to the United

Nations and its peacekeepers for reassurance and protection, and we all have a responsibility to deliver. To do so, it is critical that United Nations peacekeepers be prepared to use force, where necessary and within their mandates, to protect civilians under immediate threat. The principle of the protection of civilians is now widely supported by the United Nations and Member States, yet the question of how peacekeepers make the decision to intervene and how they choose to do so still poses huge problems. We therefore need the Force Commanders' honest assessments of what is working and what is not, and of what is possible and what is not. In turn, we will be honest with them about the resources and equipment we can provide.

I would like to ask the Generals what they and other Force Commanders need from the Council to enable their missions to protect civilians effectively. What more can we do beyond providing more resources, and how can we work with them to keep their host Governments accountable for protecting their civilians, particularly in cases such as that of South Sudan, whose Government has so clearly failed to provide that protection so far? A few weeks ago, Rwanda launched an initiative to encourage all troop-contributing countries to agree on a set of pledges to better protect civilians. The United Kingdom considers the initiative a great step forward, but I would be interested to hear the Force Commanders' views and those of other Force Commanders in the Chamber.

Let me turn now to the threat posed by asymmetric environments, set out so clearly by the Force Commander of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali. As new challenges to international peace and security emerge, new technology will have to play a greater role. But, in order to be effective, that new technology must be supported by training and exercises and must be used by troops that come ready and willing to meet evolving threats. Predeployment training is crucial, particularly in cultivating the right mindset and skills to confront asymmetric threats, so that troops stand their ground when protecting civilians. I am interested to hear the views on how we can better instil the necessary proactive and creative mindset needed by all peacekeepers deployed to modern peacekeeping missions.

In the spirit of openness and transparency, I believe that it is time for us to have a more honest conversation, like that begun today, about the national caveats of troop-contributing countries. I welcome the comments by Major General Finn. Like it or not, caveats exist and we need to work and plan around them. That can happen only if we are clear from the outset about what we are prepared to allow our troops to do. We must also be up front about changes in caveats over time, particularly as the nature of the mission or conflict changes. Caveats often do not become apparent until the situation deteriorates, leaving Force Commanders unclear about what their troops can and cannot do. It is that uncertainty that leads to problems. In the worst circumstances, it can lead to command and control failures that put the lives of troops and civilians at risk.

Let me conclude by asking all the Force Commanders in the Chamber today what more the Council and the Secretariat can do to reduce those caveats and to ensure that they and the mission leaders are aware of the caveats that remain from the outset. What more can we do to reinforce the importance of the chain of command?

I again thank the Generals for their briefings today, and all the other Force Commanders for coming to today's meeting. I look forward to hearing their views.

Mr. Ramírez Carreño (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) (*spoke in Spanish*): Venezuela would like to thank you, Mr. President, for convening this important informative briefing. We also thank Under-Secretary-General Ladsous for his comments and thank the Force Commanders of the peacekeeping operations for briefing us in the Council today.

On behalf of my country, I would like to begin by recognizing the personal commitments and sacrifice of the officers, troops and staff of United Nations peacekeeping missions. On a daily basis, they risk their lives in carrying out their tasks. We would like to honour those who have lost their lives in carrying out their mission.

We would like to focus on an issue suggested by you, Mr. President, which requires deep discussion within the United Nations, the issue of the protection of civilians, concerning which we would like to emphasize the following points.

First, we reiterate the urgent need to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical attack, as defined by the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, which is the only body empowered to develop policies and doctrines regarding peacekeeping operations, in accordance with international law and respect for the sovereignty of the States concerned. Peacekeeping

operations must emphasize the prevention of violence, using their political capital to intercede and negotiate with the parties in conflict, bearing in mind that the political settlement of the conflicts must be the primary objective of their actions.

We favour strengthening the deterrent capability of peacekeeping operations in the protection of civilians. In that regard, we support the development of rapid deployment and standby force capabilities for the protection of civilians. The military personnel of peacekeeping operations must be able not only to mobilize quickly to the host country or countries, they should also be able to deploy swiftly within a given territory. The staff therefore need adequate resources.

We reaffirm the importance of respecting and maintaining the principles that guide peacekeeping operations in protecting civilians, such as the consent of the parties, impartiality and the non-use of force except in situations of legitimate defence and in compliance with the mandate. Peacekeeping operations must not be used to impose peace. For Venezuela, the key role of peacekeeping operations must be to support the host Government, which has the primary responsibility to protect civilians. We must also provide our support to developing the institutional capacity of the State in order to work towards a sustainable solution to the conflict.

However effective a mission is in protecting civilians, it can never substitute for the role of the State. In that regard, we support the zero-tolerance policy when it comes to sexual abuse against women and children, which has taken place in some missions. Such acts are unacceptable, and those who are responsible should be brought to justice. Therefore, we also support the need to increase the presence of women in the management and composition of mission contingents, as we have discussed previously in the Council.

Turning to the issue of asymmetric threats, our country wishes to make the following points. It is increasingly common to deploy peacekeeping operations in political and security environments dominated by fragility and violence, where there is no peace to keep or no political process to support. That has resulted in a substantial increase in the number of kidnappings and killings of United Nations personnel in targeted attacks. Those are unacceptable. The use of peacekeeping operations in tasks to impose peace and to combat terrorism and international organized crime will only increase the risk of asymmetric threats and attacks against peacekeepers, including civilian personnel and partner organizations. Therefore, we must establish mandates and expectations for the peacekeeping operations that are achievable, on the basis of a clear-sighted analysis of the conflict and a long-term political strategy.

Regarding the establishment of safeguards or caveats by the troop-contributing countries for the deployment of their contingents, we would like to note that, given the immense risk to life and limb to which personnel in today's peacekeeping operations are exposed, all troop-contributing countries should have the right to discuss the objectives and purposes of the mission they are accepting. In that context, we reaffirm the importance of troop-contributing countries being able to actively participate in the Security Council's decision-making process related to the functioning of the relevant operations involving their personnel, in accordance with Article 44 of the Charter of the United Nations.

In conclusion, we wish to reaffirm that peace and the sustained well-being of peoples can be achieved through the political resolution of conflicts and addressing their root causes. Those should be the guiding principles of our efforts within the framework of the Organization.

Mr. Hmoud (Jordan) (*spoke in Arabic*): I thank you, Mr. President, for the opportunity for us to take part in this very constructive discussion. I would also like to thank the Force Commanders of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, as well as the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, for their briefings.

As many speakers have said, peacekeeping operations have undergone major changes over the past few years in order to keep up with security and political changes and to adapt to new environments in host States — environments that are often complex and complicated in nature in which there is sometimes no peace to keep, and no peace to build. Those developments include the creation of rapid intervention forces as part of many peacekeeping operations, such as the force present in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as the ever more frequent use of force by peacekeepers, which poses a challenge to the most basic principles of peacekeeping.

The primary challenge remains how to respond to non-State actors, who are present in many armed conflicts in the areas where United Nations peacekeeping operations are deployed. Such groups often operate in the absence of clear rules of engagement, use force without respect for international legal frameworks and hide among the civilian population. Their command structure is often complex, diffuse and multipronged. The linkage among armed conflict, terrorism and organized crime has grown in a large number of countries, which requires peacekeeping operations to adapt rapidly and wisely to the new political and security environment that has taken hold throughout the world.

We have observed that such emerging threats have forced peacekeeping operations to implement such principles under pressure and constraints, outside the framework of their mandates and without the foundations of a clear strategy. That principle has been followed for the past few years without developing the concepts and necessary principles within the framework of peacekeeping operations mandates, and without awareness or understanding of the dynamic of peacekeeping operations on the ground or the root causes of conflicts that would lead to appropriate responses or put an end to the phenomenon that strengthens extremism, terrorism and transnational organized crime.

Furthermore, it is essential to think about the use of force to maintain the mandates of peacekeeping operations within the framework of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations in a transparent way that respects international law and international humanitarian law while continuing peacekeeping operations and protecting them from attacks, especially those forces active under Chapter VII.

The activities of rapid intervention forces mean that civilian employees of peacekeeping operations sometimes become the targets of those asymmetric attacks and the victims of asymmetric threats. The Council must therefore develop a common understanding, in consultation with Member States and troop-contributing countries, for devising ways to address that problem and to uphold the legality of measures undertaken in that regard, as well as to implement mandates in an appropriate way to address unconventional, asymmetric challenges and threats.

Furthermore, it is essential to closely look into the partnerships between the United Nations and international and regional organizations and to review peacekeeping mandates to ensure that they can have recourse to force as required, as well as to strengthen their intelligence-gathering capabilities. In that regard, we hope that the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations will come up with recommendations that will enable the Organization to tackle current challenges such as the ones I have just mentioned, which while they may not threaten certain countries, pose a threat to the whole world.

The protection of civilians is discussed in an idealistic way within the framework of peacekeeping operations, which is the main thrust of their action. However, the guiding principles for the forces on the ground do not cover the protection of civilians in a systematic and comprehensive way. Very often, the guidelines have been based on the protection of military forces more than on the protection of civilians. That is understandable. However, there is a gap that needs to be considered in defining the mandates for peacekeeping operations so as to guarantee a balance between the ability to protect civilians and to protect the mandate of the mission itself with respect to the use of force to defend the mandate and to address emerging challenges.

There can be no doubt that peacekeeping operations play an important role in the protection of civilians. However, because they do so in a temporary way, a permanent solution with respect to the protection of civilians lies first and foremost with the host State. That requires work to be carried out through two processes. The first includes security sector reform, strengthening the rule of law and greater responsibilty for violations of human rights law and international law. The second process must also guarantee responsibilty and national ownership of host States in order to create a solid foundation for the protection of civilians and to guarantee that it is lasting in nature. Indeed, the protection of civilians must take into account the strategic and tactical aspects of peacekeeping operations.

That leads directly to the other elements that impact peacekeeping operations, namely, the constraints imposed by troop-contributing countries, whether they be military or police contingents, on the operations in which they play an active part. Those troops often obey the orders of their national hierarchies rather than heeding the commanders of the operation itself, which impacts the way orders are followed and executed.

Therefore, it is vital to take into account the legal responsibility of the United Nations. It is essential to underscore the need to put in writing the cooperation between United Nations and troop-contributing countries to develop and strengthen the guiding principles of the operational mechanisms of armies and police to guarantee planning and permanent contacts between them, by clearly defining the hierarchies and the lines of command and control in peacekeeping operations.

By way of conclusion, we would like to reiterate that Jordan, as an active contributor to 10 of the 16 peacekeeping operations throughout the world, will continue to support the efforts of the international community and the United Nations to develop a clear vision that offers viable solutions to address contemporary challenges and that enables us to be as prepared as possible to respond with wisdom and flexibility so as to effectively and firmly manage both the current and future challenges facing peacekeeping operations.

Mr. Delattre (France) (*spoke in French*): I thank the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Mr. Hervé Ladsous, as well as the Force Commanders of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), the United Nations Mission in South Sudan and the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization for their briefings and, of course, for their work. I shall very briefly touch upon the three topics that were presented to us.

The first concerns the protection of civilians, which is increasingly at the very heart of our mandates. This trend was not a self-evident one, but following the tragedies experienced by the international community, notably in Africa and the Balkans, it has become a necessity, in the name of the principle of humanity, which lies at the heart of the Charter of the United Nations. The High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations just recognized this, while endeavouring not to give rise to impossible expectations. We wish to pay tribute to the Blue Helmets, who face this demanding work on a daily basis.

We do not underestimate the difficulty of these mandates in crisis situations across vast territories, often devoid of infrastructure, where the population is faced with the violence of ruthless armed groups. Such implementation entails comprehensive action, which involves political settlement of crisis, prevention, support for the restoration of the State's authority and, sometimes, when necessary, the use of force. Our challenge today is to tailor peacekeeping operations in all their aspects to the implementation of these mandates for the good of the civilian population, who are the first victims of armed conflicts.

In that respect, the human aspect is of the utmost importance. Missions must be able to establish close ties with the populations they are to protect. From this point of view, the use of the French language must be fully taken into account, and I would like to recall here again that we need more French-speakers in current peacekeeping operations — from privates right up to the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General, including in New York. This is a precondition for operational effectiveness.

Finally, the protection of civilians should not be limited to ensuring their physical security. Respect for human rights and the protection of women and children are of course at the centre of our priorities. We will have an opportunity to touch upon this issue tomorrow during the open debate on children and armed conflict. But it is absolutely clear in that regard that the behaviour of Blue Helmets must be irreproachable, and zero tolerance must be applied to any actions that could sully the standing of the United Nations.

The second topic concerns action in an asymmetric environment. Blue Helmets are confronted with new threats that sometimes target them directly. In that context, we must respond with trained troops, appropriately equipped, including by providing missions with the necessary multiplier effects: air assets but also sanitary support and logistics and the engineering, combat and work units they often lack. We encourage Member States that have such capacity to fill these gaps, and we encourage the exchanges of training and education among Member States. The Force Commander of MINUSMA could provide details on the status of his force regarding these aspects, and the lessons to be learned for other theatres, such as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Lebanon, where similar challenges exist.

We also have to open peacekeeping operations to modern technology, as is proposed by the report of the Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation in United Nations Peacekeeping dated February 2015. By bolstering our capabilities in terms of information-processing and the protection of Blue Helmets, technology allows us to better understand the environment we are active in, to anticipate and to act

upstream of peaks of violence to protect people in the best possible security conditions.

Moreover, the new type of challenges we face requires an optimal mobilization of operational and logistical resources available. The operational margin of manoeuvre of a force cannot be impeded by a logistical organization that is unadapted to the theatre. On the other hand, it must be based on the rapid deployment of support capacities, including emergency measures needed for infrastructure work.

Therefore — with regard to the third topic, namely, the issue of caveats — we have the responsibility to ensure that our operations possess the necessary resources for their success and that they are used efficiently, which entails two basic requirements. One is to adapt the modus operandi of the peacekeeping operations to their mandates. Mobile, dynamic, reactive and responsive forces close to the populations are needed in relation to those who seek to derail peace processes and who target civilians and peacekeepers. A proactive attitude is the best way to respond to this dual objective, the protection of civilians and force protection. It would be useful to hear the three Force Commanders share their experiences regarding constraints linked to caveats.

The second requirement is to avoid any ambiguity during the force generation undertaken by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Fraught as it is with the risk to the force and the civilian population, we cannot allow contingents, for national reasons, to avoid carrying tasks ordered by commanders. An effective upstream consultation process is essential to dispel such ambiguities.

The report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, submitted to the Secretary-General yesterday, notes these problems facing peacekeeping operations. France will remain engaged regarding these issues and will carefully consider the numerous recommendations set out in the report.

In conclusion, I would like to reiterate France's deep-rooted commitment to United Nations peacekeeping, to which we fully contribute with Blue Helmets — for example, within the framework of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, as well as in our national capacity and under the European Union — in support of peacekeeping operations, including in Mali, the Central African Republic and Côte d'Ivoire. Today, 7,800 French soldiers are engaged in foreign operations, including nearly 1,000 directly in the service of the United Nations and 6,000 under a United Nations mandate. Since January 2013, 13 of our countrymen have paid for that commitment with their lives. The most recent was Mr. Damien Dustrit in 2014 in Lebanon. I would like to pay tribute here to their memory, as well as that of all their Blue Helmet comrades fallen on the battlefield to bring to life the ideals espoused by the United Nations.

Ms. Murmokaitė (Lithuania): I would like to thank today's invitees for their insightful, thought-provoking and detailed briefings.

As we heard earlier today, Lithuania also welcomes this once-a-year opportunity to hear from United Nations Force Commanders about the most pressing challenges in today's peacekeeping. Given the changing peacekeeping environment and the ever more complex challenges that peacekeepers face, an exchange of this kind once a year is the very least we can do. Let me take this opportunity to express our appreciation to all of the Force Commanders, whose sound judgment and decisions under increasing fire are critical for the successful implementation of mandates, as well as for the lives of peacekeepers and those they serve to protect.

The primary responsibility to protect civilians, as we often say, rests with the national Governments. However, as seen in various crises, there is often a tragic lack of the national capacity needed to protect one's own populations, and at times even a lack of political will. The protection of civilians under imminent threat therefore remains a key priority for peacekeeping missions. Mission leadership is crucial, as it must ensure that the protection of civilians, including women and children, is considered an essential task by the mission as a whole. That is a key element of the "one mandate, one mission, one force" approach, which we strongly support.

In the current environment, a static presence is far from sufficient; peacekeeping has progressed along a much more kinetic line. Peacekeepers must be ready to demonstrate their willingness and the courage to act in a proactive manner — to fight insecurity and protect civilian lives and themselves. Within the mission, all must be fully committed to the mandate, prepared and ready to defend it by force if necessary. Implementing protection mandates requires clear focus, improved situational awareness, intelligence and analysis, adequate structures, logistics and materiel, training and resources.

In South Sudan, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) took an extraordinary step to accommodate thousands of internally displaced persons at its sites, saving countless lives. However, acknowledge the challenges such a step poses to the Mission. As a political solution remains distant, the numbers of those in need of protection can only keep growing. All parts of the United Nations should work together to find suitable solutions to address the situation. Closer interaction with local populations, as some of the Force Commanders noted earlier today, and better cooperation with the Government of South Sudan are required, especially when it comes to securing a safe environment to facilitate the voluntary return of internally displaced persons. However, continuous violations of the status of forces agreement do not help and are a cause of serious concern.

In that context, I would like to inquire whether Force Commander Tesfamariam could elaborate on the practical impact of such violations on the protection mandate and on the Mission's own provisions and supplies. Other questions to the Force Commander would be: To what extent would an arms embargo help UNMISS in its task to protect civilians? How do peacekeepers themselves feel in that complex environment? What measures have been taken to ensure their safety under the current circumstances? What is the perception of the operating climate in terms of the Mission, at present?

Turning to operations in an asymmetric environment, it is important to recognize that a number of countries hosting United Nations peacekeeping operations are countries where the levels of threats from militant and terrorist groups are among the highest. The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) is one of the missions that is operating in an exceptionally challenging environment, where local populations seem to expect it to substitute for the Government and provide services for which the Government is responsible, while at the same time they are interpreting its role as biased in favour of one or another side to the conflict. All of that is taking place in the presence of a persistent terrorist threat and growing interconnections between trans-border organized crime, terrorist networks and traffickers — as a result, MINUSMA has become one of the deadliest missions.

Attacks on peacekeeping personnel in Mali have taken a significant toll on the Mission's efforts: 28 peacekeepers have lost their lives. We pay our respects to all of those that have lost their lives in that noble Mission.

The recent mine attack of 28 May in the region of Tombouctou on the MINUSMA convoy in which the Force Commander and Police Commissioner were travelling is yet another reminder that the Mission has become a primary target of attacks by extremist groups. In our view, the lack of accountability in that case, as in many others involving the deaths of peacekeepers, has certainly become a big challenge.

With regard to the operational environment, the Force Commander has spoken about the importance of intelligence gathering and better intelligence analysis. We can only concur with that, and on the use and importance of adequate modern technologies in operations in ensuring a safer environment and facilitating preparations for the adequate protection of civilians.

As another delegation has already asked, we too would like to know how the Security Council could better enable Force Commanders to lead and command their forces. What are the current command and control structures, and are they flexible enough to operate in a highly dynamic threat environment? What else can we do, as Council members, to facilitate the work of the Force Commanders? What training and additional equipment would be most needed? If one had to indicate one item, what would it be? What additional measures must be considered to ensure the protection of the force itself? Is the increase in the ceiling of the missions under the current circumstances sufficient? Would an additional increase be necessary?

Finally, on national caveats, the safety and security of peacekeepers is, and must remain, among the top United Nations priorities, as well as one of the key factors for troop- and police-contributing countries to continue providing the forces necessary in the field. In a rapidly changing security environment, even long-functioning traditional peacekeeping missions are facing asymmetric and unconventional threats. Countries therefore resort to using caveats to minimize the risks to their contingents. As has been described before and as the information note indicates, that practice may become a challenge to command and

control, and hence to mission performance, and is of course of concern to Force Commanders.

In that respect, mutual commitments between the United Nations and the troop-contributing countries are necessary. The United Nations must ensure that the utmost will be done to ensure safe and secure mandate implementation, as well as the safety and security of peacekeepers. We in the Council must support those efforts by ensuring that missions are adequately supplied and trained and that accountability for attacks against United Nations personnel is pursued with all due vigour. At the same time, the troop-contributing countries should recognize the need for efforts to flexibly adjust a mission's posture and tasks in an environment that is evolving daily, as well as the growing need for robust peacekeeping operations that are a departure from the long-standing static peacekeeping tradition. That issue is naturally linked to the peacekeeping operations review process and should be further discussed in the light of the new report and recommendations by the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations.

Lastly, many delegations have spoken about accountability for sexual crimes and a zero-tolerance policy regarding sexual crimes without regard to the perpetrator. Certainly, my delegation adds its voice to all of those concerns expressed and calls for accountability and strict implementation of the zero-tolerance policy.

The President: I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of Malaysia.

At the outset, I join other colleagues in thanking Under-Secretary-General Ladsous and the Generals for their respective briefings, which my delegation followed with much interest. At the same time, Malaysia wishes to express its appreciation to all of the Force Commanders and Heads of the military components of United Nations operations and of the African Union Mission in Somalia, for joining us in the Security Council today.

We believe that this briefing is timely, particularly in light of the completion of the review work of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations and the submission of its report to the Secretary-General just yesterday. As much ground has been covered by previous speakers, with views and comments with which we can associate ourselves, my remarks will be fairly brief.

Malaysia concurs with the assessment that over time the protection of civilians has emerged as a central purpose and core mandate of contemporary peacekeeping operations. We note that, at present, 10 of the existing 16 peacekeeping missions are mandated to undertake protection-of-civilians mandates. The challenges to civilian protection are vast, ranging from needs on the ground and a challenging security environment, to a lack of infrastructure. Peacekeepers are often responsible for protecting large populations spread out over vast areas, but they usually lack material resources to effectively execute the mandate.

We strongly believe that, in order to implement the mandate to protect civilians, peacekeepers themselves must be held to the highest standard. In that regard, any allegations of impropriety on the part of peacekeepers or the civilian components of United Nations missions must be addressed in a timely, transparent and impartial manner with a view to maintaining, among other things, the integrity and credibility of the institution as a whole. A zero-tolerance policy must be observed and adhered to fully.

We take this opportunity to once again express our deepest sympathies and condolences to the loved ones of the peacekeepers who have sacrificed their life.

The ongoing conflict in Mali clearly outlines the complexity of the crisis, in which the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali has been placed at the forefront, particularly with regard to addressing intersecting challenges, including the nexus between local conflict dynamics, organized crime and jihadist extremism.

The United Nations has been able to take innovative steps in other conflict situations to better improve the deployment of peacekeepers on the ground and to adapt to a hostile environment, such as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. At a technical level, the deployment of intelligence units and the procurement of improvised explosive device-resistant equipment, including armoured and mine-protective vehicles, has helped to enhance the capabilities of peacekeepers to operate more safely in an asymmetrical environment.

With regard to the briefing on caveats, we concur with the observation that the inclusion of so-called national caveats could complicate or hamper the smooth running of United Nations peacekeeping operations and missions with regard to issues such as parallel chains of command, the linking of field contingents to

national headquarters main command, and personnel performance. We are fully aware that effective command and control is paramount to the successful pursuit of a mandate. In our view, this parallel command structure should be dealt with by addressing troop-contributing countries well before formulating a mandate. We also understand that the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations has also seriously considered this issue in its recent report to the Secretary-General and has made certain recommendations for addressing it.

As a troop- and police-contributing country, Malaysia looks forward to working closely with other Council members and all interested partners and stakeholders on improving the efficiency and effectiveness of United Nations peacekeeping, as well as on safeguarding the safety, security and well-being of our peacekeepers.

I now resume my functions as President of the Council.

I give the floor to Lieutenant General Tesfamariam to respond to the comments and questions raised.

Lieutenant General Tesfamariam: The first question I will address concerns the major challenge that the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) is facing. We face major challenges in addition to the presence of internally displaced persons (IDPs), which is not common in United Nations peacekeeping history. We have a shortage of resources. As I tried to indicate, we have what I consider a United Nations mindset issue within the existing manpower, but more than that, the most critical issue is the continual fighting in South Sudan since December 2013. Because of that we have continual displacement and civilians are suffering. It is a serious challenge for the Mission.

I remember the Council's visit to South Sudan and its visit to the IDP site in Malakal. The singular message of the IDPs to the members of the Security Council was very clear. They requested the Council to help them by silencing the guns. I consider that very challenging. It is a challenge to the Mission, to the civilians, to the mandate and to us. It is really worrying, and it is the cause behind our IDP sites and protection sites, which are still increasing in number gradually.

I believe we have the right approach with regard to the protection of civilians. Given the reality in South Sudan, our approach is to be more proactive and to try to reach the civilians and not wait for them to come seeking assistance or protection. On the other hand, we have the IDP issue and we have civilians waiting for protection from physical threats and for humanitarian assistance. That kind of situation is still a dilemma, even to the Mission, and has affected our priorities.

Our resources are obviously limited, compared with the reality on the ground. The 4.6 million people in need of humanitarian assistance are also in need of protection. The issues of humanitarian assistance, life-saving assistance and the protection of civilians exist at the same time in South Sudan. There is also a geography issue and an infrastructure issue. In addition, we have the status of forces agreement issues. The option we have is to maximize the resources in hand for the Mission with regard to the status of forces agreement issue. That issue is causing a serious challenge to the Mission, including through the violations; restrictions on our patrols; our spending unnecessary time dealing with checkpoints; and the detainment of our contingent-owned equipment, sometimes for close to two months; and the difficulties of movement on the ground and by air. I want to be more clear: out of all the major challenges in South Sudan, the critical challenge is that the guns are not yet silent, and civilians are paying the price for that. We are doing our level best at the Mission through communication and physical deployment, but because of the lack of respect for the ceasefire agreement, we face significant challenges. What the civilian IDPs said in Malakal was that their priority was not positive peace, their priority was negative peace — to silence the guns under all circumstances.

The other issue concerns the limitations, in particular the force-multiplier capabilities. In addition to the status of forces agreement and the restrictions, I know from Headquarters that serious efforts have been made to engage the parties, but still we have a serious gap in capabilities. We depend too much on infantry. Aviation capabilities to control the security situation within our area of responsibility are still seriously lacking in UNMISS.

Another issue is the training gap. I tried to indicate that the technical and tactical training was there. I am happy with the commitment of the forces. I am happy with the technical and tactical skills. However, the protection of civilians is about serving and defending civilians. They should be our focus. I feel that there is a gap in terms of knowledge, preparation and skills. Within the forces, we are not yet aware of the particularity of protecting civilians and what makes it different from the general knowledge of

peacekeeping on the part of the soldier on the ground and the commander at the operational level. It is about civilians, about people and about going into the middle of the conflict. Obviously, there will be risks. I do not think that troops are adequately trained to know about the risks and that there is a solution to those risks. It is not just about risk, but paying the price for that risk and ensuring a solution.

I am happy to hear that it is a dual mission, defending yourself and defending civilians at the same time when it comes to the protection of civilians, because the nature of the conflict is not that predictable. When it threatens you and threatens civilians, it is not easy to predict. So it requires, I believe, knowledge, training and preparation, taking into consideration the particularities of the protection-of-civilians mandate and tasks. What is required is a force with a particular quality of commitment, one that is knowledgeable on how to be proactive and that more or less understands what to do in whatever the circumstances might be, because not everything can be controlled; not everything can be dealt with by saying, "Do this, do not do that". Tactical commanders are enablers themselves; so are are operational commanders. It is also a time-sensitive engagement. So with respect to the skill and knowledge of how to be proactive and how to take the initiative, always keeping in mind that the reason why we are there is to save civilians, I am not sure if this is fully included in our training systems, including before deployment.

So there are a few problems in this regard. With respect to my views on the issue of caveats, let me say that caveats exist, although some troop-contributing countries say that they do not have them. This shows that there are differences. A force is there for one mandate, one task, one vision, one area of operations. Division within a uniformed force is not good; it affects performance. In my understanding, addressing the concerns expressed is the solution, because we need a force that is not divided. This is in addition to the impact of operations.

Finally, in UNMISS, until recently we had the original mandate, and now we have a revised mandate. It is a shift that takes into consideration the realities on the ground and existing challenges. We have realigned ourselves with the support of Headquarters; that is why I am happy with the support and attention we receive, as well as its frequency. We have realigned ourselves decisively. We have completed the process of realigning ourselves with the new mandate and the new tasks; the Mission is trying to do its level best to adapt to the situation.

The President: I thank Lieutenant General Tesfamariam for the clarifications he has provided.

I now give the floor to Major General Lollesgaard to respond to the comments made and questions raised.

Major General Lollesgaard: Mr. President, I thank you for all the support from the members of the Council and for the questions posed; I will try to be brief in my responses.

First, with respect to the question posed by the representative of Chad, on how we can prevent asymmetric threats, I think that that is a very difficult question. I do not think that we are capable, with this mandate, of preventing it, but we can deter it through the effective use of our forces; with increased cooperation with Operation Barkhane, which is working in the area; and, of course, with the help of the local security forces from Mali. So that is what we will be stepping up after the signing of the peace agreement. I have given my guidance for the next quarter, and clearly the focus is on northern Mali.

I think that the issue regarding the intervention brigade is a very complex one, because we would step that up and then get the anti-terrorist mandate, which would make things extremely complicated for the Mission. I do not think we are set up for that or that we are ready for that. We do not have the intelligence, the equipment or the mobility to do that. I believe that having this mandate and having an intervention brigade under us would complicate things. So, again, I think that this issue need to be dealt with in closer cooperation with Barkhane and the security forces of Mali.

In terms of minimizing the risk, yes, we are doing that; we are doing everything we can. We are improving all of the bases now with a shorter timeline than originally envisaged. I am also happy to learn that Chad is bringing in more protective vehicles for their forces.

The representative of Chile asked a question about intelligence. I think that the sharing of intelligence is extremely important, and I look forward to the upcoming report on intelligence. Intelligence-sharing in United Nations missions is complicated. We know from previous experience that even in smaller alliances, intelligence-sharing is complicated, and it is even more complicated in the United Nations. I think we need

to find a good way to approach this issue, and I look forward to the report, which may be able to help us in that respect.

Has the availability of intelligence increased security? Yes, definitely. I can cite several situations in which we have saved lives by having good intelligence. I can also cite several cases in which we lost civilian lives because we did not have the necessary intelligence. I think, therefore, that we need to do more.

In answer to the United States representative's question on what we can do with respect to the issue of casualty evacuations, the answer is: more helicopters. That is quite easy. We are quite limited; we have limited night capability for casualty evacuations. In connection with the the issue of caveats, certain Member States now actually request that their forces be within a one-hour reach of a helicopter. This puts a lot of pressure on my helicopter capabilities before I can put certain troops on the ground. So, definitely, more helicopters with night capabilities is the best way of mitigating this issue.

To the representative of New Zealand, I would say a few things about the information campaign. I think that on the conceptual level and on the Force level, I am in a good position. With the assistance that I have now, the staff can provide me with the necessary input for my information operations. I need to train and teach within my organization; we are working on that, and I have asked a few experts to devise a concept for us. But I might come back, maybe, with additional requirements in that respect.

When it comes to the protection of vehicles, I have made it a rule in the Mission that we do not drive through a village without stopping and talking to civilians. This is a common operational tactic. This is very easy, because in Mali it always 100 kilometres to the nearest place; so you drive 100 kilometres and stop in the village and talk to the people. Then you drive another 100 kilometres and so on. This is a bit of an exaggeration, of course. But this is the way we are doing it, so as to get out of these armoured boxes.

In terms of the many issues relating to training, I think that we need to step up training. I think that the training programme provided by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations is rather good, but perhaps we need to align it more with the thinking of the troop-contributing countries (TCCs). I think that we should also be more receptive of actually having evaluation teams coming into the TCCs to look at the final training and verify that it is scenario-based and also that we are taking the right approach and understand the environment in which we are going to work.

In response to the French representative, let me say that I will provide some lessons learned on what I believe my particular Mission needs in terms of training. We will develop that during the next couple of months, so that information will be shared with both the Secretariat and the troop-contributing countries.

There are many questions on the issue of the caveats, and I asked what the Council could do. We need to encourage contributors not to set too many caveats. I understand, however, that there are national issues related to operations in such environments. I can live with caveats, as long as I know what they are and they do not come up the day after I have issued a task call. If they are fully clear and we know about them beforehand, we can work around them. Of course, it would be preferable if countries did not insist on caveats.

That was a quick run-through, although there is much more to say. Lunch hour is drawing near. I will conclude here on the lessons learned, and I fully agree with France. And I also apologize for my poor French, among other things, but I am trying to improve. That is also a lesson learned.

The President: I thank Major General Lollesgaard for the clarifications that he has provided.

I now give the floor to Major General Finn to respond to comments and questions raised.

Major General Finn: I thank you, Mr. President, and the other members of the Security Council for your statements and supportive comments. I think, in relation to the queries raised, that I can perhaps stay with them and make a few general comments, starting with the United States query regarding how troop-contributing countries notify us of their caveats. By the way, a caveat for myself is the Force Commander of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), who is the operational commander in the Golan. I hope that I do not step on his toes in any way.

In relation to caveats, we should recall that UNDOF existed for many years in a very benign situation, with both parties to the agreement, Israel and Syria, largely abiding by the terms of the Disengagement Agreement, a situation that completely changed from 2012 to 2013. We had issues of observation posts being overrun, car-

jackings, observers — even UNDOF members — being detained for short periods, and deficiencies in medical evacuation and casualty evacuation. That was well described by the representative of New Zealand, which was one of the countries that imposed caveats, and has been raised by all the countries that have imposed caveats.

It is completely understood what drove the imposition of those restrictions. In short, UNDOF underwent a big reorganization, and by the end of 2013 and in early 2014, it had become a much more assertive force with a robust force reserve and capability. As mentioned by the representative of New Zealand, countries with UNDOF and the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), have mitigated the problems to a large extent with better medical evacuation facilities, contingency planning, armoured vehicles, strict movement control and special surveillance, among other elements. The conditions were such that the Secretary-General in his reports to the Security Council was able to point out those mitigating measures and encourage troop-contributing countries (TCCs) to lift their caveats. There were also many briefings to TCCs by UNDOF and to UNTSO TCCs by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Thankfully, countries like New Zealand and many others did lift those caveats, but, as I said, there are still some that did not. With regard to how the caveats were reported, there were no major sudden notifications. They were done in a reasoned way, I think, through the Permanent Representatives to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

The representative of Spain asked a question as to what extent we can still carry out our mandate. Observer Group Golan is doing that to the best of its ability, meeting the tasks set by the Force Commander of UNDOF. It is still manning observation points on the Alpha line, and it has taken up additional temporary observation posts — all of which, to some extent, fill the gaps created by having to leave the area of separation. In that regard, Observation Group Golan and UNDOF are well placed to continue to carry out the mandate as best as they can, within the constraints that currently exist, while not being able to position themselves within the area of separation to the extent that we would want.

I think that that more or less covers what I wanted to say in response.

The President: I thank Major General Finn for the information that he has provided.

I now give the floor to Mr. Ladsous to respond to the comments.

Mr. Ladsous: The lunch hour is getting close, so I will be brief, but I would like to make a few comments on some of the issues discussed at length today.

First, on the protection of civilians, it is very much at the core of all our contemporary mandates, and we need to continue to do a better job of it. Of course, we cannot have a peacekeeper behind every citizen of the country concerned. We therefore have to manage expectations. At least, within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, we have put together an action plan for the next two years that places a very strong emphasis on training — a much more intensive effort — training that trains peacekeepers both prior to and immediately after deployment, so as to ensure that they are fully aware of what is expected of them.

In the light of that, it is important to recall that the protection of civilians is in the first instance the responsibility of the host State. If they cannot do it themselves, for any number of reasons, that should not impede the work that we are trying to do. In that connection, I ask the Council to consider South Sudan, a country where we felt that we needed to do a better job to protect civilians. We needed attack helicopters. That request was denied. We needed unarmed aerial vehicles. My request was denied personally three times by the President last year. We also required the ability to move around, the freedom of movement. That was denied. Not only did the Government deny us freedom of movement, but the Sudan did the same numerous times. If we factor into that the fact that Juba, for instance, declared members of our senior personnel personae non grata and that yesterday it was announced that from now on any United Nations personnel who took pictures would be considered spies, that raises a number of concerns. I wanted to highlight that problem.

On caveats, one has to be realistic. No one is questioning the legitimacy of a troop-contributng country having good reasons, which have to do with its sovereign rights, for imposing restrictions on the use of its personnel. I would nevertheless say thata we have to be made aware of those restrictions in advance. We cannot first find out about them at the moment when things take a turn for the worse. When the situation on the Syrian side of the Golan Heights became dangerous, some countries refused to remain there. That is of course their right and privilege. We cannot, however, tolerate what has happened in other theatres — including

South Sudan — where we discovered suddenly that a particular contingent was taking orders from its capital, circumventing the Force Commander and the entire chain of command. We cannot accept that, and if such a problem arises, we need, at the very least, to be aware. If the Force Commander can manage those caveats, that is fine, but we should try to avoid being put in a situation of fait accompli, ex post facto. If that does occur, my policy is clearly to send the contingent in question back home to its troop-contributing country, because we simply cannot rely on it.

I think that we must continue to do all we can to enhance the protection of the force. The safety and security of our peacekeepers is an absolute priority. General Lollesgaard enumerated a number of points that are being considered, including intelligence. The purpose of intelligence is to better protect our people, in addition to helping them do a better job. It all fits into the wider picture.

The representative of the United States raised the issue of medical evacuation. This is an area in which change is very rapid: for a long time we could rely on the concept of the "golden hour" in smaller theatres where facilities were available reasonably quickly and the force was relatively compact. Nowadays, we need much more mobility and there is more fractioning of contingents. When one battalion is spread across five, six or seven positions, as happens in the Central African Republic, for instance, we need to factor in the medical element at the level of the basic unit, which means level-1 facilities in every deployment, if possible. The more contemporary 10-1-2 guideline is the way forward, but it requires not only medical means but also helicopters with night-flying capabilities and, once again, the consent of the host Government. Not so long ago, in the Sudan, a peacekeeper died of his wounds because the request for a helicopter flight to pick him up was refused.

In terms of more generic messages, General Maqsood Ahmed, the Military Adviser for Peacekeeping Operations, and I have decided to emphasize performance at this year's conference of chiefs of military components, even more than in previous years, because that is the expectation of the Security Council and the membership of the United Nations, and we must continue to do better.

With regard to the issue of sexual exploitation and abuse, I completely agree that any act of sexual misconduct is unacceptable and that one act is too many. A zero-tolerance approach is required from all concerned, not only the Secretariat but also the Member States. It was, after all, the Member States that decided to retain the capacity to prosecute and ultimately pass judgment on those responsible for such terrible acts. We must all do our duty in that regard and must not forget the problem of the victims, who must be helped. We are working on the matter.

As the generals present today know, military capability is about leadership, and all of them are displaying that quality. I want to thank them for that and tell them that we and the Security Council stand by their side, as reflected in today's debate.

The President: I thank Mr. Ladsous for the clarifications he has provided.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.

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Security Council

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Official communiqué of the 7465th (closed) meeting of the Security Council

Held in private at Headquarters, New York, on Wednesday, 17 June 2015, at 3 p.m.

In accordance with rule 55 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the following communiqué was issued through the Secretary-General in place of a verbatim record:

"On Wednesday, 17 June 2015, the Security Council, pursuant to annex II, sections A and B of resolution 1353 (2001), held its 7465th meeting in private with the troop- and police-contributing countries to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali.

"The President invited Mr. Hervé Ladsous, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, to participate in the meeting in accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

"The Security Council and the troop- and police-contributing countries heard a briefing by Mr. Ladsous.

"Members of the Council, Mr. Ladsous and representatives of participating contributing countries had an exchange of views."

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